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Introduction
The most important constitutional case of the new millennium is based on a
fundamental misconception about the nature of the corporation. Citizens United v.
FEC, 1 which prohibited the government from restricting independent expenditures

1

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118

for corporate communications, 2 and held that corporations enjoy the same free
speech rights to engage in political spending as human citizens, is grounded on the
erroneous theory that corporations are “associations of citizens” 3 rather than what
they actually are: independent legal entities distinct from those who own their stock.
From an analytical perspective, the core of Citizens United is that “the First
Amendment . . . prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of
citizens, for simply engaging in political speech,” 4 and that corporations are properly
conceptualized as “associations of citizens” that have “taken on the corporate
form.” 5 Citizens United held that the regulation of the speech of “disfavored
associations of citizens—those that have taken on the corporate form” was
unconstitutional. 6
Our contribution to the literature on Citizens United is that the case is as much
a case about corporate law, as it is about the First Amendment. None of the justices
deny the importance of political speech in their various opinions about the nature,
function, or scope of the First Amendment’s protections of free speech. Rather, their
major dispute in Citizens United is about the applicability of settled First
Amendment protections to a particular juridical entity, the corporation, and the scope

2

See id. at 349, 354, 356.
See id. at 356.
4
Id. at 349.
5
Id. at 356.
6
Id.
3

3
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of the state’s ability to regulate the corporations it allows to be created and gives
distinct legal status.
In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, views the
corporation as an “association of citizens” and on this basis concludes that
corporations are entitled to First Amendment protections. Not just that, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion holds that Congress may not take into account the distinctions
between corporations and human beings in regulating political speech, and that
corporations must be permitted the same freedom to speak as human beings. In
dissent, Justice Stevens fails directly to challenge Justice Kennedy’s existential
conception of the corporation notwithstanding the fact that that it constitutes the core
of the majority opinion. This Article fills that void. Our challenge considers and
rejects the Citizens United majority’s conception of the corporation as an
“associations of citizens” and reaffirms its status as an artificial, metaphysical, and
legal construct that exists separate and apart from its investors. These investors are
not “associated” either with one another or with the corporation in which they have
invested any more than the various creditors of a corporation are associated with
each other or with the debtor to which they have extended financing. Shareholders
simply are owners of investment interests with certain contractual rights. They are
not “owners” of the corporation in any sense of the word, and their relationship with
the corporation is purely statutory and contractual.
4
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The notion that the corporation is an associated group of individuals is
misguided and at odds with objective reality. But this counterfactual assertion that
the business organization cannot be disentangled from the human beings who are the
ultimate “owners” of the corporation led the majority in Citizens United to the
conclusion that corporations have constitutional rights equal to human beings.
Corporations are accurately viewed not as associations of citizens, but rather as
distinct legal entities in their own right that have been formed under statute and
authorized by law to act as autonomous “persons” with full legal responsibility. It is
this view of the corporation that provides the analytical justification for allowing
corporations to enter into contracts and be sued in their own right. On this account,
the corporation can—and must—be distinguished analytically from its shareholders. 7
The Citizens United view of the corporation as an association of individuals is
inconsistent with the established conception of the corporation as a juridical entity
with limited liability.
Under the “association of citizens” conception of the corporation advanced by
the majority in Citizens United, the corporation is merely an extension of its
shareholders. This conception confuses the corporation with the general partnership

7

See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 73 (2010) (“The corporation
has been regarded from its inception as a legal entity distinct from its owners.”); 12B WILLIAM
MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 5709 (rev. vol. 2015)
(“A corporation is an entity distinct from its shareholders . . .”).
5
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form of business organization. In fact, the entire point of the incorporation process is
to permit the creation of a legal entity that is not an association of individuals, but
rather a discrete legal entity whose rights and obligations are distinct from those of it
its creators, investors, managers, and other constituents.
We base our argument that corporations are separate and distinct legal entities
and that they are not “associations of citizens” as Citizens United asserts on three facts
about the corporate form: (1) the treatment of corporations as separate legal entities is
what distinguishes corporations from general partnerships and sole proprietorships
and what justifies the legal notion of “limited liability” and other central
characteristics of the corporate form, such as the ability to contract and to sue and be
sued; (2) corporations do not have owners, they have investors who have contractbased, financial interests in the firms and limited management rights; and (3)
corporations are not fiction, but fact only because the law makes them real and distinct
entities with a legal identity.
In Part I of this Article, we discuss the nature of the corporate form by
describing its core attributes and explain that one must infer from the nature of the
corporate form itself that the corporation is an entity, not an association of
individuals. In Part II, we expand upon the analysis in Part I by examining certain
settled legal characteristics that the Supreme Court has itself recognized to
distinguish the corporation from other forms of business organization that can more
6
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plausibly be viewed as associations of individuals. We conclude Part II by noting a
simple, empirical reality that cuts against Citizens United’s conception of the
corporation as an “association of citizens”: stockholders are not owners of the
corporation, but rather contract claimants.
In Part III, we discuss the reality that in most other areas of its jurisprudence
the Supreme Court embraces the traditional entity view of the corporation, and does
not treat corporations as associations of citizens. Thus, Citizens United and its
progeny are outliers, in tension with the Supreme Court’s decisional law in key areas
like standing, tax law, criminal law, and other areas of constitutional law. Our
analysis shows that in the great bulk of its jurisprudence, the Supreme Court adheres
to our view of the business corporation, which is that it is a distinct legal entity whose
rights and obligations are subject to statutory constraint. In fact, by long tradition,
starting under Chief Justice Marshall, 8 corporations are the opposite of Lockean–
Jeffersonian human beings endowed with inalienable rights that cannot be taken
away by the government. 9 By contrast, corporations have only those rights society
gives them by statutory law, and any statutory law may take into account the unique
nature of corporations in limiting their ability to act.

8

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (Marshall, C. J.).
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl (U.S. 1776); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas
Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate
Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 890–91 (2016) (explaining the historical conception
of the corporation as having only the rights given to it by society, which is the polar opposite of
human beings who have natural rights that cannot be taken away without due process of law).
9

7
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We then point out in Part IV profound problems with Citizen United’s
assertion that corporations are “associations of citizens.” Namely, that assertion
comes without supporting legal authority and for good reason. Neither the law nor
empirical fact supports the idea that stockholders are associated citizens, much less
with any common political or social viewpoint.
Part V then notes the stark difference in the Supreme Court’s approach when
dealing with the free speech of labor unions. In the union context, the Supreme
Court’s principal concern has been ensuring that no union member has his dues used
for political speech without his express authorization, and has held that it is a First
Amendment violation to use union dues for political speech. 10 Just this year, in
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council
31, 11 the Court went further and held that unions could not even collect fees to cover
the core costs of bargaining for higher wages from a workforce member who did not
join the union. 12 In the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,13 Congress
embraced concerns like this and gave corporations the ability to engage in political
speech by raising funds voluntarily from stockholders for this purpose. This means
took into account the corporate law consensus that a stockholder’s decision to invest

10

Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 240–42 (1977).
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
12
Id. at 2486.
13
2 U.S.C. § 441b.
11

8
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in a business corporation does not rationally involve any authorization for the
corporation to use treasury funds for political speech, and that stockholders are of
diverse political viewpoints and only have a shared interest in one thing, getting a
good return on their investment. But, applying a starkly different viewpoint than it
takes in cases like Abood and Janus, the Supreme Court struck down McCainFeingold and trivialized the substantial leeway McCain-Feingold had given for
corporations to speak. In analyzing this contradiction, we identify the market
realities that make it even less plausible that 21st century American business
corporations can be deemed “associations of citizens,” especially when most of their
stock is owned by institutional investors, to whom American investors are in essence
compelled to turn over their capital to save for college for their kids and retirement
for themselves. And we conclude Part II by noting a simple, empirical reality that
cuts against Citizens United’s conception of the corporation as an “association of
citizens”:

stockholders are not owners of the corporation, but rather contract

claimants.
Finally, in Part VI we comment on the lack of any source for the Citizens
United majority’s view that the corporation is an association of individuals. In
particular, we observe that corporations are creatures of state law, not federal law. 14
As the Court observed in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., “[s]tate regulation of

14

Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (“Corporations are creatures of state law”).
9

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118

corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes
are a product of state law.” 15

Therefore, determinations about the nature of the

corporation, such as whether the corporation is a distinct juridical entity or an
association of individuals, should be made by reference to state law, not federal law.
To further this point, we survey those forms of entities that might be more plausibly
considered associational in form than corporations, and note that in the main, most
of them are trending strongly toward the entity conception. After doing so, we
address those corporations most rationally considered to be vehicles for the shared
viewpoints of those who form them: non-profit corporations. As to them, we
highlight two features that buttress our core point.

To wit, most non-profit

corporations are member corporations and do not even have stockholders. And as
important, these corporations do not fund their speech using the entrusted capital of
their members or stockholders. Rather, they speak using funds they raise specifically
for that purpose from donors—exactly the method that Congress left open to
corporations in McCain-Feingold and that the Citizens United majority said
constituted a total ban on corporate speech.
We conclude by noticing an irony. It was the legislative branch, not the
judicial branch that is supposedly more learned in the law, that was the one that
understood corporate law when addressing political speech. Congress considered

15

481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
10
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the nature of corporations when enacting McCain-Feingold and took into account
that corporations are not associations of citizens, but separate, state-created entities
formed for reasons that cannot be rationally attributed to the shared political or
philosophical views of their investors. As such, Congress allowed corporations
broad freedom to engage in political speech, but only by using funds voluntarily
contributed for this purpose by stockholders to a corporate-controlled political action
committee (PAC). By this means, Congress left ample room for the corporation to
act as a collective vehicle for stockholders who wished to affiliate for that purpose,
but protected other stockholders from being forced to subsidize speech that the mere
decision to invest cannot plausibly be thought to endorse. By contrast, the Supreme
Court ignored, or misunderstood, the traditional corporate law concept of the
corporation and thereby subjected millions of American investors to suffer the
involuntary use of their entrusted capital for speech that has no rational connection
to their decision to buy stock. That is bad corporate law making bad constitutional
law.

11
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I.

The Nature of the Corporation: Economics, Law, and Citizens United
Citizens United involved a test of the constitutionality of Section 203 of the

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold), 16 a federal law
prohibiting corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make
independent expenditures for speech that is either an “electioneering communication”
or that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate.17 McCain-Feingold
defined an electioneering communication as any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office that is
made within 30 days of a primary election and that is publicly distributed.
Much has been written about the facts of Citizens United. Sufficient for
present purposes is to point out that the procedural history of the case makes clear
that the Citizens United majority sought to use the case to make a broad statement
about the ability of all corporations to engage in political speech. Although there
were narrower ways to resolve the precise case before the Court, because it involved
a non-profit corporation and unusual facts, 18 it is inarguable that the majority wanted
16

2 U.S.C. § 441b.
Id.
18
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319–22 (noting that “Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation”
with “an annual budget of about $12 million” accrued mostly “from donations by individuals”).
Several scholars have noted that the Court could have resolved Citizens United on narrower
grounds. See Laurence H. Tribe, Dividing Citizens United: The Case v. The Controversy 30
CONST. COMMENT. 463, 473 (2015) (“From the initial briefing to the final argument, the Court
greatly expanded the scope of the issues presented. And in its decision, the Court dodged
a multitude of paths to a narrower ruling.”); Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens
United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 415 (2013) (“[Citizens United] was written
with a broad brush, turning its back on several plausible narrower grounds for decision”).
17

12
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to issue a ruling to address the kind of corporations that are most common and most
wealthy: business corporations that are formed with the goal of making profits. For
our purposes, therefore, we focus much of our discussion on business corporations,
as these are the corporations with massive wealth that Congress was most concerned
with regulating in McCain-Feingold.
In Citizens United, the majority struck down the provision of McCainFeingold that prohibited corporations from making expenditures in favor of the
election or defeat of political candidates, except through corporate-sponsored
PACs. 19 In so doing, the majority rejected the idea, which we will come back to,
that Congress had not prohibited corporate speech, but had solely put into place
regulations about how corporations could speak that took into account the factual
differences between corporations and human beings. In particular, Citizens United
did so by giving no weight to the provisions in McCain-Feingold that allowed
corporations to establish and solicit contributions to “a separate segregated fund to
be utilized for political purposes.” 20 Under those provisions, corporations could
solicit voluntary contributions from key corporate constituencies, in particular

19

52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) (“It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by
authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any
election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political convention
or caucus held to select candidates for any political office.”).
20
52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2).
13
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stockholders and employees. 21 But, corporations could not use treasury funds
directly to engage in electioneering. 22
McCain-Feingold sought to ensure that only funds voluntarily contributed by
stockholders were used by corporate speech. McCain-Feingold represented no
revolution in legislative techniques designed to constrain the operation of business
corporations. For much of the 19th century, corporations could only engage in a
merger with unanimous consent of the stockholders, and the appraisal right arose
when that stringent rule was tempered. 23 And when general incorporation statutes
were enacted, courts used the ultra vires doctrine to forbid the use of corporate funds
for political and charitable purposes, on the grounds that these were not purposes

21

See id. (excluding the “solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized
for political purposes” from the definition of “contribution or expenditure”); id. § 30118(b)(4)(A)
(prohibiting such a separate segregated fund from soliciting contributions “from any person other
than its stockholders and their families and its executive or administrative personnel and their
families”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 415–16 (“Under BCRA, any corporation's ‘stockholders
and their families and its executive or administrative personnel and their families’ can pool their
resources to finance electioneering communications. A significant and growing number of
corporations avail themselves of this option; during the most recent election cycle, corporate and
union PACs raised nearly a billion dollars. Administering a PAC entails some administrative
burden, but so does complying with the disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements that the
Court today upholds, and no one has suggested that the burden is severe for a sophisticated forprofit corporation.”) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22
See 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a).
23
Norwood P. Beveridge, Interested Director Contracts at Common Law: Validation Under the
Doctrine of Constructive Fraud, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 97, 109 (1999) (corporate law required
unanimous consent of stockholders for “extraordinary transactions,” citing People v. Ballard, 32
N.E. 54, 59 (N.Y. 1892), and Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578, 590–93 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1861))
14
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within the corporation’s stated purposes. 24 And once generally chartered business
corporations began to get involved in politics, federal and state regulation to limit
their ability to use their wealth to influence elections quickly arose and was validated
by the courts. 25
But as we will note later, the Citizens United majority ignored how
corporations do business in general; the Court viewed McCain-Feingold as too
burdensome, because the corporation had to create a distinct entity and account for
it. Additionally, the Court concluded that “[a] PAC is a separate association from
the corporation[,] [s]o the PAC exemption from [McCain-Feingold’s] expenditure
ban . . . does not allow corporations to speak.” 26 That is, Citizens United gave
dismissive treatment to Congress’s authorization for corporations to engage in
speech by acting as a collective action device to “associate” those stockholders who
had a common desire to speak through the corporation, and insisted that the
corporation as a distinct entity had to be allowed to speak directly using treasury
funds.

In doing so, the Court ignored the reality that most large business

24

See generally Albert J. Harno, Privileges and Powers of a Corporation and the Doctrine of Ultra
Vires, 35 YALE L.J. 13 (1925).
25
Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling
Citizens United with Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 890–93 (2016)
(documenting this history).
26
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337–38 (“PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to
administer and subject to extensive regulations. For example, every PAC must appoint a treasurer,
forward donations to the treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons
making donations, preserve receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and report
changes to this information within 10 days.”).
15
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corporations form specific corporations—subsidiaries—to pursue their various
business lines and to achieve the benefits that come with the law’s recognition of
these subsidiaries as having a distinct legal identity. The McCain-Feingold PAC
exemption involved no burden that corporations like Exxon-Mobil and Apple do not
happily accept all the time.

Having trivialized the means Congress gave to

corporations to speak using its ability to aggregate contributions voluntarily from its
supposedly “associated” stockholders, the Citizens United majority then pronounced
McCain-Feingold “an outright ban” on political speech by corporations. 27 Because
of its own strained conclusion that McCain-Feingold acted as a total ban, the
majority then found it easy to conclude that Congress had violated the First
Amendment. But as an empirical matter, the idea that before Citizens United
corporations were subject to a “total ban” on political speech is fanciful. Whatever
a “total ban” means, a situation where our politics are awash in corporate money is
not a “total ban.” 28

27

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337–38.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending,
101 GEO. L.J. 923, 930–37 (presenting evidence of significant corporate political spending before
Citizens United); Tilman Klumpp et al., The Business of American Democracy: Citizens United,
Independent Spending, and Elections, 59 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2016) (documenting the role of corporate
money in politics before and after Citizens United); John C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics,
Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657 (2012);
Eleanor Neff Powell & Justin Grimmer, Money in Exile: Campaign Contributions and Committee
Access, 78 J. POL. 974 (2016) (presenting empirical evidence from 1980 through 2012 that business
interests seek short-term access to influential legislators through campaign contributions to
committee members); Alexander Fouirnaies & Andrew B. Hall, How Do Interest Groups Seek
Access to Committees?, 62 AM. J. POL. SCI. 132 (2017) (providing similar evidence in the context
28

16
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Citizens United ignored the entity theory of the corporation and adopted a view
that the corporation is an aggregate of its shareholders. As Adam Winkler trenchantly
observed, “not once” did Justice Kennedy in his opinion “mention corporate
personhood. He never said that corporations were people and nothing in his opinion
turned on that notion:”29
Corporate personhood—the idea that a corporation is an entity with
rights and obligations separate and distinct from the rights and
obligations of its members—is entirely missing from the court’s opinion.
The court afforded broad free speech rights to corporation, but not
because they were people. Instead . . . the Citizens United decision
obscured the corporate entity and emphasized the rights of others, like
shareholders and listeners.
Citizens United repeatedly described the corporation as “an association
that has taken on the corporate form.” 30
Citizens United treats the corporation as “a mere collection of men,”31
attributing the rights and responsibilities of the corporation’s shareholders to the
corporation itself. 32 This analysis confuses the general partnership form of business
organization, which is an association of partners, whose individual rights and
of U.S. state legislatures, using data from 1988 through 2014); HEIDI WELSH & ROBIN YOUNG,
SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENTS INST., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF POLITICAL EXPENDITURES: 2011
BENCHMARK
REPORT
ON
S&P
500
COMPANIES
2
(2011),
http://
www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/Political_Spending_Report_Nov_10_2011.pdf (“S&P 500 companies
allocated $979.3 million (87 percent) of the $1.1 billion they gave in 2010 to [federal] lobbying.
They spent a further $112 million (10 percent) on state level candidates, parties and ballot
initiatives and $31 million (3 percent) on federally registered political committees.”).
29
ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS 364 (2018).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349, 354, 356 (referring to corporations as “associations of
citizens”).
17
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responsibilities are indistinguishable from those of the entity, with the corporate form
of business organization, which is a separate juridical entity with distinct rights and
responsibilities. The rights and responsibilities of corporations are limited by the
states that create the legal framework that allows them to come into existence and
regulates their activities.
A. The Nexus of Contracts Theory
Just as the aggregate theory and the entity theory provide two ways to view the
corporation through a legal lens, the “nexus of contracts” theory and the “separation
of ownership and control” theory provide two ways to view the corporation through a
theoretical economic lens.33

There is a critical analytical difference, however,

between the theoretical economic view of the corporation and what should be the factbased legal view of the corporation.

Specifically, the economic views of the

corporation are not mutually exclusive: one can logically view the corporation
simultaneously both as a nexus of contracts and as an organization characterized by
the separation of ownership and control.

33

Sometimes as a matter of description, three theories of the corporation have been identified. These
theories “are the aggregate theory, which views the corporation as an aggregate of its members or
shareholders; the artificial entity theory, which views the corporation as a creature of the State;
and the real entity theory, which views the corporation as neither the sum of its owners nor an
extension of the state, but as a separate entity controlled by its managers.” Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1001 (2010) (describing these
as the “standard theories found in literature,” and citing David Millon, Theories of the Corporation,
1990 DUKE L.J. 201). But both the creature of the state theory and the real entity theory view the
corporations as separate entities. These theories are not logically distinguishable, and the fact is
that corporations are real because the state makes them so.
18
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In contrast, the legal conceptions of the corporation as either a distinct entity or
simply an aggregation of its stockholders are mutually exclusive. As a matter of logic,
the corporation may be conceptualized by law as either an entity or an aggregate but
it cannot rationally be conceptualized simultaneously as both. The entity theory and
the aggregate theory are not complements: they are substitutes. In fact, the entity view
of the corporation serves as an alternative to the aggregate view. The purpose of the
entity view is to provide a way to conceptualize the corporation that distinguishes it
from its progenitor, the partnership form of business organization. More precisely,
the entity view respects the evident core purpose of society’s creation of the
corporation: to give a corporation a legal identity distinct from any of its constituents,
including its stockholders. Put simply, theoretical economic conceptions of the
corporation are not designed to describe what corporations are as a matter of law and
thus empirical fact. As we show, corporate law is clear about those basic questions,
because the essential point of corporate law is to create entities distinct from their
constituents.
The core of the nexus of contracts theory is that the corporation is best described
as a nexus or web of bilateral contracts between inputs of capital and labor.34 Even

34

R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). For applications of the theory
see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUMBIA L. REV.
1416 (1989); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency, Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Eugene F. Fama
& Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 30l (1983); see also
19
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under this view, however, the corporation is a “legal fiction” 35 in that its existence is
dependent on the enabling authority of state legislation; that is, the law makes fact
what would otherwise be fiction. The basic insight of the nexus of contracts theory is
that when the corporation is deconstructed into its component parts all that one
observes is a constellation of contracts that describe the relationship of the various
firms and humans who have claims on the cash flows of the enterprise.
Here we make two points about the contractual theory of the corporation as it
relates to the conception of the corporation embedded in Citizens United. First,
although the nexus of contracts conception of the corporation has much to recommend
it as an analytical tool, this theory is incomplete because it envisions a counter-factual
world in which the state does not exist. Second, the nexus of contracts theory is not
actually a theory of the corporation. Rather, it is a meta-theory that describes all forms
of business organization, including partnerships and sole proprietorships. As such,
the nexus of contracts theory is inconsistent with the “association of individuals”
conception of the corporation found in Citizens United because the nexus of contracts
theory treats all of the various contractual inputs to the corporation, whether they be
suppliers of equity or debt or labor, as equal. In contrast, the “association of

Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982); Reinier
H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857
(1984); Kenneth E. Scott, Corporate Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance
Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983).
35
William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORN.
L. REV. 407, 409 (1989).
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individuals” theory inexplicably exalts the role of shareholders over other constituents
of the corporate enterprise in a way that is inconsistent with the contractual approach.
Finally, and most importantly, we observe that, under the nexus of contracts
theory, the various constituents to the corporation must, of course, have counterparties. This counterparty is an entity, namely the corporation itself. As such, the
nexus of contracts theory is consistent with the entity theory. In contrast, the nexus
of contracts theory is inconsistent with the “association of individuals” conception of
the corporation in Citizens United.

If the corporation were an association of

individuals rather than a separate and cognizable legal entity unto itself, then the
contracts made by contributors of labor and capital would be with the individuals who
constitute the association. But of course this is not the case: the contracts are between
contributors of labor and capital and the corporation itself.
1. The Role of the State
The nexus of contracts approach to corporate law is a powerful conceptual tool.
On this model, entrepreneurs hire managers to administer the affairs of the
corporation. But, of course, the corporation cannot operate without labor and capital,
and in order to attract these inputs, the corporation must make attractive binding
contractual promises to induce suppliers of capital to agree to contribute their human
or monetary capital to the business. The more credible the promise that a corporation
is able to make, the better terms the corporation will obtain from investors of all sorts.
21
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The state plays a disquietingly limited role in the nexus of contracts theory,
because the leading theorists slight as mundane that which is necessary. There is no
“entirely satisfactory” answer to the question of why the state’s involvement in
general or corporate law in particular is required or what role the state or corporate
law play in the nexus of contract theory.36 According to the nexus of contracts theory,
the state’s role is to fill in blanks in the inevitably incomplete contracts that
contributors of labor and capital forge with the corporation. As Frank Easterbrook
and Dan Fischel have observed:
corporate law is a set of terms available off the-rack so that
participants in corporate ventures can save the cost of
contracting. There are lots of terms, such as rules for voting,
establishing quorums, and so on, that almost everyone will
want to adopt. Corporate codes and existing judicial
decisions supply these terms “for free” to every corporation,
enabling the venturers to concentrate on matters that are
specific to their undertaking. . . . Corporate law—and in
particular the fiduciary principle enforced by courts—fills in
the blanks and oversights with the terms that people would
have bargained for had they anticipated the problems and
been able to transact costlessly in advance. On this view
corporate law supplements but never displaces actual
bargains—save in situations of third-party effects or
latecomer terms. 37
This simple and elegant portrayal of the role of the corporation is incomplete
because it ignores that the key role for corporate law—and for the state—is creating

36

Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1416,
1444 (1989).
37
Id. at 1444-45.
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the legal infrastructure that allows for the existence of the corporation and its
endowment with legal rights and duties.

The nexus of contracts view of the

corporation simply assumes the existence of the corporation. But corporations do not
exist by any organic or natural process. Although corporations are legal entities, they
are not carbon-based life forms that have evolved into sentient creatures. You and
your teammates cannot call “limited liability entity” on the state of nature’s business
playground: It takes the law to set the rules under which you may do so.
The existence of the corporation can only be attributed to the state. Still more
recently, scholars studying the theory of legal entities, particularly Henry Hansmann
and Reinier Kraakman, have shown that the state is essential in providing the
corporation with distinct property rights in general and, in particular, a discrete,
“portioned” pool of assets that are shielded from the shareholders’ personal
creditors.38
No one can form a corporation without the acquiescence of the state, which
creates the framework by which corporations can be created. The process involves
filing a certificate of incorporation. But before this can happen, the state has to pass

38

See Henry Hansmann and Reinier H. Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.J. 387 (2000); Henry Hansmann and Reinier H. Kraakman, Organizational Law as Asset
Partitioning, 44 EUR. ECON. REV. 807 (2000); Henry Hansmann and Reinier H. Kraakman,
Property, Contract and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of
Rights,” 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373 (2002); Henry Hansmann, Reinier H. Kraakman and Richard
Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335 (2006); see also Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 34, at 310 (“[M]ost organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for
a set of contracting relationships among individuals.”).
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an enabling statute that permits the corporation to be formed in the first place. For
example, under Delaware law, the relevant statute provides that:
[a]ny person, partnership, association or corporation, singly or jointly
with others, and without regard to such person’s or entity’s residence,
domicile or state of incorporation, may incorporate or organize a
corporation under this chapter by filing with the Division of
Corporations in the Department of State a certificate of incorporation. 39
Corporations can be formed only after the state creates this legal framework.
And, under this legal framework, corporations are legal entities that have legal
personhood in the sense that they can enter into contracts, sue and be sued, pay taxes,
and generally shoulder legal responsibility in their own names, without
simultaneously obligating any of their constituents, including their stockholders.
2. All Firms, Not Just Corporations Are Nexuses of Contracts
As a matter of empirical, inarguable fact, corporations are creatures of the state.
It is not realistic or accurate to assume that corporations somehow exist without the
benefit of enabling action by the state and that people can contract with them. Thus,
the state plays a larger conceptual role in the life of the corporation than the nexus of
contract theoreticians recognize. It is only after the state has both: (1) permitted the
formation of the corporation in the first place; and (2) recognized it as a legal entity
that the contracting process can begin.

39

8 Del. C. § 101(a).
24

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118

As important, the nexus of contracts theory is not a theory of corporations in
particular, but rather a general theory of business organizations. It therefore does not
even speak to what corporations specifically are as a matter of law. The nexus of
contracts theory applies with equal force to all forms of business organization,
including partnerships and limited liability companies, and even sole proprietorships.
Notably, some of these forms of business organization require state intervention
for formation and others do not. Those forms of business organization that do not
require state intervention can be plausibly viewed as “associations of individuals,” but
those forms of business organization that do require intervention and can only be
created under the authority of a state statute are fundamentally different. These state
statutes grant individual entrepreneurs the right to create new legal entities that are
categorically distinct from their investors and from their creators.
Without an enabling state statute, a corporation cannot be formed. These
statutes operate to give corporations their central defining characteristic, which is their
status as distinct legal entities.

By contrast, general partnerships and sole

proprietorships, which, unlike corporations are associations of individuals, cannot
claim the attributes of “corporateness” that legally emanate from corporations’ status
as distinct legal entities.
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3. The Separation of Ownership and Control
Before the modern conception of the corporation as a nexus of contracts, the
most innovative theoretical perspective on corporations was based in the emergence
of corporations that had grown large, and whose dispersed stockholders were seen as
unable to constrain the managers, directors, and officers who ran corporate affairs. In
their classic work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle and Means
identified this growing reality and its consequence, a phenomenon they called the
“separation of ownership and control.” 40

This phrase captured the notion that

shareholders, who were characterized as the “owners” of the corporation, were
generally passive investors who ceded ownership of the business to professional
managers who “control” the corporation in ways that often served only their own
private interests and caused mischief for shareholders and society.
The conception of the corporation as characterized by a separation of ownership
and control is undeniable as a descriptive matter, but somewhat controversial from a
normative perspective. Berle and Means and their adherents took the view that the
separation of share ownership and managerial control raised profound challenges that
justified imposing limitations on the scope of business corporations’ powers and

40

ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932).
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activities. One characterization of the legal implications of the Berle and Means view
of the corporation was articulated by Justice Brandeis as follows:
Whether the corporate privilege shall be granted or withheld is always
a matter of state policy. If granted, the privilege is conferred in order
to achieve an end which the State deems desirable. It may be granted
as a means of raising revenue; or in order to procure for the community
a public utility, a bank or a desired industry not otherwise obtainable;
or the reason for granting it may be to promote more generally the
public welfare by providing an instrumentality of business which will
facilitate the establishment and conduct of new and large enterprises
deemed of public benefit. Similarly, if the privilege is denied, it is
denied because incidents of like corporate enterprise are deemed
inimical to the public welfare and it is desired to protect the community
from apprehended harm. 41
Although the concept of the separation of ownership and control is merely
descriptive, at some point, the term “separation of ownership and control” and the
phrase “Berle and Means corporation” came to stand for the proposition that
corporations posed big problems for society. Eventually, scholars more narrowly
focused on the interests of stockholders arose to respond to the normative implications
raised by those who described the corporation as characterized by a separation of
ownership and control.42

Significantly, scholars associated with the law and

economics movement accepted the descriptive fact that the corporation can be
characterized as a separation of functions akin to the separation of ownership and

41

Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 545 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L.
& ECON. 30l (1983).
42
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control. But these scholars described the ownership function of shareholders in
economic terms as being characterized by their role as risk-bearers and residual
claimants.43
On the law and economics revisionist view of the separation of ownership and
control conception of the corporation, the shareholders invested their money, and
therefore assumed some of the risks associated with the failure of the firm and, on the
flip side, were entitled to the excess cash flows from the earnings of the firm once
suitable provision had been made for the prior claims of creditors. Although the
shareholder “owners” assumed this risk-bearing function, the control function was
carried out by professional managers who had developed a specialized set of skills,
known as human capital that enabled them to excel at management and decisionmaking.

On this view, professional managers were compensated for these

management and decision-making skills, which shareholders did not possess. Thus,
the law and economics movement transformed the Berle-Means separation of
ownership and control, with its negative connotations, into a slightly different
conception of the corporation as being characterized by a “separation of decision
(management) and risk-bearing (ownership) functions” that exists in part “because of
the benefits of specialization of management and risk bearing” but also “because of

43

See e.g., id. at 302–03 (describing agents “who contract for the rights to net cash flows” as
“residual claimants or residual risk bearers”).
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an effective common approach to controlling the agency problems caused by
separation of decision and risk-bearing.”44
The key difference between the Berle-Means “separation of ownership and
control” view of the corporation and the law and economics “separation of decisionmaking and risk-bearing” view of the corporation is about how wide a lens from which
to view the dangers of the separation of ownership and control. Berle himself viewed
these dangers as involving more than stockholders, and thus he and others like him
worked to strengthen external constraints on corporate managers in a way that reduced
their ability to abuse their power.45 Berle, for example, was a key author of the New
Deal, 46 many of the provisions of which had the effect of creating external regulation
that limited the extent to which corporate managers could use corporate power to

44

Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON.
30l, 301‒302 (1983); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 34. Although Jensen and Meckling’s work
is considered innovative, it must be remembered that their economic gloss was not novel. The
governance of corporations in the United States resembles real polities for a good reason.
Corporate statute writers grappled with the same concerns that animated Locke, Montesquieu, and
the Founders of our Republic: How could we create structures under which the governed benefit
from centralized managements? How do we balance effective governance with accountability to
the interest holders? Corporate law thus uses a combination of tools of republican democracy
(e.g., elections of directors) and direct democracy (e.g., the right to vote on certain essential items
such as charter (i.e., constitutional changes) or mergers). Jensen and Meckling is considered
brilliant law and economics, but in many ways is a restatement of principles elementary to any
student of our constitutional history.
45
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Decision-Making and Social Control, 24 BUS. LAW. 149, 152
(1968) (“The corporate system of our time . . . can and should conform to social requirements; it
can and should lend help to government and to quasi-public and other institutions whose task is to
develop a society both good and just.”).
46
See generally Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Reshaping the American Economy, 9 CENTENNIAL REV. 209
(1965).
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harm, not just investors,47 but workers,48 and consumers, and society generally. By
the time more stockholder-focused law and economics scholars began theorizing, they
accepted as a foundational fact that external law, exemplified by the New Deal,
existed to protect other corporate constituents. 49 They therefore focused on the
implications of the separation of ownership and control, and the limited rights of
stockholders. 50 Why would investors entrust their capital to corporations over which
they only had limited influence?51

47

For example, the New Deal created a system of securities regulation to deter fraud and selfdealing. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77a et seq.; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.
48
See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 151–69; Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (establishing the right to
a minimum wage).
49
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 51 (“[P]olitical mechanisms, not market mechanisms, are the
appropriate way to determine the allocation of scare resources to alternative uses.”); Kenneth J.
Arrow, Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency, 21 PUB. POL’Y 303, 310 (1973); STEPHEN
M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 429 (2002) (taking this view and noting that
“the federal government has intervened” to protect workers, such as through Family and Medical
Leave Act provisions requiring unpaid leave for family and medical problems, Occupational
Health and Safety Administration regulations requiring safe working conditions, and civil rights
laws prohibiting discrimination). See also Leo E. Strine & Nicholas Walter, Conservative
Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens
United, 100 CORNELL. L. REV. 335, 352–54 (2015) (documenting the view among conservative
corporate law theorists that business should focus on profits because political processes protect
other interests).
50
See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 34; Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Case] (proposing
increased shareholder power based on an efficiency rationale).
51
Law and economics scholars have been concerned about the relative weakness of stockholders
in comparison to corporate managers because they normatively believe that business corporations
generate the most societal value by focusing on making profits for their investors in a lawful
manner. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33; Arrow, supra note 49, at 132; Michael C. Jensen,
Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 7 EUR. FIN.
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On either the broader or narrower view, however, there is a clear and sharp line
of demarcation between managers who control and make decisions for the corporation
and the shareholders who allocate risk capital to the corporation in the hope of a return
on their investment. This notion of the corporation appears to be understood at least
partially by the justices in Citizens United. Justice Scalia, in concurrence, addresses
the dissent’s argument that “‘speech’ refers to oral communications of human beings,
and since corporations are not human beings they cannot speak.”52 Scalia’s response
is that corporations speak through agents: “The authorized spokesman of a corporation
is a human being, who speaks on behalf of the human beings who have formed that
association—just as the spokesman of an unincorporated association speaks on behalf
of its members.”53
This treatment of the corporation is logically and factually flawed. The fact
that an inanimate object such as a corporation has a human spokesman does not

MGMT. 297, 302 (2011); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 15–22 (1991). They share with other scholars the premise that
the corporation is in fact distinct from its stockholders and that those stockholders only have
limited rights to constrain corporate action. Scholars who believe business corporations should be
obliged to act with equal regard toward all their constituents, and not put profit over social
responsibility, embrace the weakness of stockholders and the distinct nature of the corporation as
an entity for another reason. They view the fact that the corporation is not an association of
stockholders as the key “attribute” not “deficiency” of corporate law, because it allows for business
corporations that conduct their affairs in a socially responsible manner. See COLIN MAYER,
PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER GOOD 38 (2018). For that reason, they fear
that developments that make corporate managers more subject to stockholder direct influence are
dangerous. Id. See generally LYNN STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012).
52
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 392 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring).
53
Id.
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somehow transform the inanimate object into an animate object. After all, a person
who takes her cat to the veterinarian is speaking on behalf of the cat, but doing so does
not transform the cat into a person. In other words, the fact that a corporation can only
speak through agents undermines rather than supports the claim in Citizens United
that a corporation is an association of individuals.
Moreover, in the face of the ubiquitous and pervasive agency costs that
inevitably come with the separation of management and risk-bearing, there is never
any assurance that those who purport to speak on behalf of investors are truly doing
so.54 This point appears particularly strong in light of the fact that shareholders are
not a monolithic group. Shareholders may all agree that they would prefer that the
value of their shares increase in value rather than decrease in value, but the notion of
shareholder homogeneity goes no further than this. Shareholders are as heterogeneous
as society as a whole, and the notion that a corporate spokesperson can “represent”
the shareholders in a non-commercial realm such as speech is farcical. As Ronald
Gilson and Michael Klausner have observed:
Under existing corporate law stockholders’ ability to influence how
management runs a corporation’s business is largely limited to annually
electing a board of directors. Stockholders’ interests are supposed to
be solely financial: Management maximizes the return on stockholders’
investment and stockholders pass judgment on management
performance when they elect directors. When stockholders share this

54

John C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens United,
9 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 667 (2012).
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common concern with profits a simple governance system serves them
and the economy well.
But stockholders do not have a common interest in political activity.
They may be Republicans or Democrats, pro-choice or pro-life, for or
against the Senate’s health care bill. A stockholder of a pharmaceutical
company, for example, could oppose a politician who promises to favor
the pharmaceutical industry because of the politician’s views on
financial sector reform. 55
Significantly, in our view, both of the economic approaches to the corporation,
the nexus of contracts approach and the separation of risk-bearing (“ownership”) and
management (“control”) reflect the fact that a defining feature of the corporation is
the sharp distinction between the active strategic and tactical functions of management
and the passive investment and risk-bearing functions of the shareholders. These
competing conceptions of the corporation reflect a consensus among economists of
all ideological stripes that corporate managers often do not speak for shareholders, but
instead speak for themselves. 56

55

Ronald Gilson and Michael Klausner, That’s My Money You’re Using, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2010),
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0329/opinions-citizens-united-corporate-shareholders-onmy-mind.html#21f6fb0b586c; see also Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law
Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 961 (1984) (pursuit of goals other than profit maximization as
“especially disturbing because profit maximization is the only goal for which we can at least
theoretically posit shareholder unanimity”); Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesny, Why They Give
at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the
Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1224 (“[S]hareholders may have very different views on
what is good for society.”). See generally Strine & Walter, Conservative Collision Course, supra
note 49, at 364–65 (gathering authorities for this proposition).
56
See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 34 (presenting a model in which managers act in ways
that serve their own interests at stockholders’ expense); Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, Corporate
Charitable Giving, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1191, 1200–02 (2002) (raising concerns about agency costs
in corporate charitable giving); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political
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Moreover, the very concept that corporate managers speak for shareholders
obscures the fact that shareholders are by no means monolithic in their views about
politics. In fact, the heterogeneity of shareholders is such that it is inevitable that
corporations who purport to speak on behalf of their shareholders are speaking only
on behalf of a subset of such shareholders. Further, both of the economic views of the
corporation are based on the assumption that a corporation is a separate entity distinct
from its shareholders.
This shared belief is also based on another stubborn legal fact that Citizens
United’s associational theory fails to acknowledge. Stockholders do not get to
choose the message and send out a human corporate spokesperson to deliver it on
their associated behalf. That is not how corporate law works. Except as to limited
issues on which they have a direct vote, 57 stockholders only vote for directors. Under
a majority of states’ corporate laws, directors are not required to give stockholders’
interests primary weight, they are entitled to consider the interests of other corporate

Speech: Who Decides?, 123 HARV. L. REV. 83, 90–93 (2010) (“[T]here is no reason to expect that
the preferences of the particular individuals who make the company’s political speech decisions
will match those of shareholders” because shareholders usually “do not sort themselves among
companies according to their political preferences”). There is also empirical literature on the
potential for agency costs in corporate charitable giving and political donations. See, e.g., Ronald
W. Masulis, Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 592 (2015); Hao
Liang & Luc Renneboog, Corporate Donations & Shareholder Value, Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.
Finance
Working
Paper
No.
491/2016,
at
22–23,
25–26
(2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2885936.
57
See 5 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 2097, Westlaw (last updated
Sept. 2017) (“[T]he powers of management vesting in the shareholders as a body are very
few . . . .”).
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constituencies. 58 In speaking for the corporation, therefore, it is the board that sets
corporate policy and that policy is not one that must be based on what the
stockholders view as the correct perspective. And, even in states like Delaware with
a strong focus on stockholders, the directors, not stockholders, determine policy, and
they do not have a duty to satisfy momentary stockholder demands. 59 Stockholders
have limited influence and have to throw the bums out to change policy, a difficult
and expensive proposition. 60 Shareholders’ traditional power relative to managers
is captured by the title of Professor Roe’s book: Strong Managers, Weak Owners:
The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance. 61 Stated simply, it is precisely
because corporations are distinct from, and cannot be relationally considered as an
association of any of them, that theorists like Berle, 62 Friedman, 63 Easterbrook and
Fischel, 64 and Bebchuk 65 have spent so much time considering how to constrain the

58

See Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears,
1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 85; Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can
Constituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42
LOYOLA L. REV. 765, 768 n.13 (2009).
59
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to
Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1762–64 (2006).
60
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 688–94
(2007) (documenting the costs and hurdles to running a proxy contest). For a classic work
examining shareholder access to the proxy machinery, see Melvin Eisenberg, Access to the Proxy
Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1970).
61
MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE FINANCE (1996).
62
See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 40.
63
See generally Friedman, supra note 51.
64
See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
65
See generally Bebchuk, The Case, supra note 50.
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power of corporate management to ensure that corporations further, rather than
erode, public welfare as they diversely view it.
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II.

The Core Attributes of Separate Legal Entities

The preceding section of this Article details how economists understand the
corporation not as an “association of individuals” but as a distinct legal entity separate
from its shareholders. In this section, we examine Citizens United’s assertion that the
corporation is an association of individuals from a legal perspective. The core of our
argument is that there are forms of business organization that are associations of
individuals, but that the corporation is not one of them. Indeed, we show that the
entire point of the corporate form is to allow for the creation of organizations that are
distinct from their shareholders. Thus, not only is the notion that corporations are
associations of individuals misguided and inconsistent with corporate law’s
conception of the corporation, it is antithetical to the state law conception of the
corporation. If the corporation were merely an “association of individuals,” rather
than an actual legal entity in its own right, the justification for immunizing
shareholders from liability for corporate debts would disappear. After all, if corporate
speech is shareholder speech, then by parity of reasoning, corporate debts are
shareholder debts.
For thousands of years, human commerce took the form of sole proprietors
bartering goods and services.66

Over time, the dominant form of business

66

See JONATHAN MACEY, DOUGLAS MOLL & ROBERT HAMILTON, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 1
(13th Ed. 2017).
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organization became the partnership.67 Under state law, partnerships are associations
of “two or more persons” who organize to carry on as co-owners “a business for
profit.”68 As a consequence of their status as associations of persons, partners are
agents of the partnership and are jointly and severally liable for the debts of the
partnership. Unlike corporations, partnerships truly are associations of individuals.
Simply put, the organizational form that the Court describes in Citizens United is a
general partnership, not a corporation.
In the west, the idea of the corporation began with the Romans. Indeed, Roman
law introduced the very idea that “organizations could be legal entities in their own
right with a legal personality that was distinct from the individual who comprised
them.” 69 The very term “corporation” derives from the Latin word corpus which
translates into English as the word “body,” which presents an entity that is authorized
by the state to act as an individual. Initially, cities were organized by the Romans as
corporations. Gradually the concept was extended to certain community organizations
called “collegia” that served community groups or religious societies. There is some
evidence that an early form of business organization called the “publicani,” which was
organized to build aqueducts, manufacture arms, construct temples, collect taxes, and
perform certain governmental functions, received a corporate status (habere corpus)

67

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 130 (3d Ed. 2005).
Unif. Partnership Act § 102(10); Rev. Unif. Partnership Act § 202(a).
69
MAYER, supra note 51, at 65.
68

38

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118

that included a grant of limited liability for investors as early as the third century.
Although this feature did not persist over time, it reemerged in the early 19th century
in the U.S. and England.70 As both a matter of law and of history, because partnerships
were associations of individuals, individual investors could control their investment
by their right to withdraw their investments at will. 71
As recent important work by Dari-Mattiacci, Gelderblom, Jonker, and Perotti
has shown, this ability easily to withdraw capital subjected partnerships to runs by
investors and made the organizations unsuitable for carrying out long-term strategies
or for raising debt: 72
Traditional Roman partnership law adhered strictly to the
principle of exit at will, which gave each individual
partner the right to force the liquidation of the partnership.
This principle prevented parties from credibly agreeing to
remain in a partnership for the long term: lock-in contracts
were not fully enforceable in court. Overcoming this
limitation required a legal innovation, not merely a
contractual one. Only the law could grant capital
permanence to private corporations, extending a privilege
until then enjoyed by public corporations such as
townships, monasteries, and hospitals. 73

RONALD COLOMBO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 31‒32 (2014).
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The problem outlined by Dari-Mattiacci, Gelderblom, Jonker and Perotti
persists in modern times. Take for example a 1985 case concerning a general
partnership consisting of three partners, Thomas Bernabei, James Serra, and Howard
Wenger. 74

As is typically the case in partnerships, each of these individuals

contributed capital to the partnership and shared in the partnership’s profits and losses.
Sometime after the partnership purchased a title insurance policy, two of the partners,
Bernabei and Serra, sold and transferred their partnership interests to the third partner
Wenger and to a new partner, one James Valentine. When the partnership attempted
to collect on the title insurance policy, the insurance company rejected the claim on
the grounds that when Bernabei and Serra left the partnership and Valentine joined
the partnership, the old partnership was dissolved and a new partnership was formed.
The insurance company argued that the insurance policy was with the defunct former
business entity not with the latter business entity, which automatically formed when
the old partnership was dissolved following the withdrawal of the two partners. The
court agreed, observing that the common law rule that a dissolution occurs and a new
partnership is formed whenever a partner retires or a new partner is admitted was still
in place after the enactment by the state of Ohio of the Uniform Partnership Act, which
reflects the “aggregate theory of partnership.”75 As such, the original partnership was
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the party to the insurance contract and the new partnership was not, and the new
partnership had “no standing to sue the defendant” for breach of contract.76 For
hundreds of years, the tactic used by business people for avoiding the results like this
is to form a corporation, which is a separate and distinct legal entity capable of
contracting in its own name and of surviving the withdrawal of partners or the passing
of partnership interests.
The point here is simple: the state intervened to permit the formation of the
corporation, a form of business organization that was specifically designed to be a
legal entity separate and distinct from its investors. Corporations are legal entities and
not associations of individuals because if they were associations of individuals, they
would not be able to raise equity or to attract lenders or to operate with any sort of
regularity or stability.
The remainder of this Section explores the implications of the entity theory and
demonstrates that the organizational form known as the corporation must be
considered an entity and cannot be considered an association of individuals. In
contrast, the partnership is an association of individuals or an “aggregate of the
individual partners with no legal differentiation between the business and the partners
themselves.”77
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Id. at 123‒25.
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As we show, all of the fundamental characteristics of the corporation are
consistent with the separate legal entity conception of the corporation and inconsistent
with the association of individuals conception of the corporation to which the majority
in Citizens United subscribed.
A. Limited Liability and Piercing the Corporate Veil
Perhaps the greatest logical flaw in the conception of the corporate form
embraced by the majority in Citizens United is its implications for the concept of
limited liability. If the corporation were in fact an association of individuals rather
than a discrete legal entity in its own right, then, just as the shareholders would enjoy
free speech rights, so too would they be legally responsible for the debts of the entity
because limited liability is a consequence of the entity theory of the corporation and
the law’s rejection of the associational theory of the corporation.
The relationship between the Supreme Court’s notion that corporations are
associations of individuals and the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was clearly
articulated by Adam Winkler in his book We the Corporations: How American
Businesses Won Their Civil Rights. 78 As Winkler observes, treating the corporation
as an association of citizens collapses the distinction between the corporation and its
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members, “suggesting the courts see right through the corporation and focus instead
on the people who compose it.”79 Winkler further observes that:
Corporate lawyers have a name for this way of thinking about
corporations. They call it “piercing the corporate veil.” The ordinary
rule, ever since the days of Blackstone, is that there is a strict separation
between the corporation and the people behind it. That is why the
corporation, not the stockholders, is liable if someone is injured using
the company’s products. In a small number of highly unusual cases,
however, the courts will pierce the corporate veil, ignoring the separate
legal status of the corporation and imposing liability on shareholders
personally.80
Professor Winkler’s notion that treating the corporation as an association of
citizens is the equivalent of piercing the corporate veil is inaccurate.81 The doctrine
of piercing the corporate veil presupposes that a corporation is a “juridical entity with
the characteristic of legal ‘personhood.’”82 The legal recognition that corporations are
distinct legal entities that are not associations of shareholders is reflected in the fact
that courts recognize that it is legitimate to create a corporation or other form of
limited liability business organization such as a limited liability company “for the very
purpose of escaping personal liability” for the debts incurred by the enterprise.83 And

Id. at 54‒55.
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it is precisely because corporations have legal status as juridical entities with the
characteristic of legal personhood that courts’ equitable authority to pierce the
corporate veil is to be exercised “reluctantly” and “cautiously.” 84
Rather than viewing Citizens United as a case that pierces the corporate veil, it
would be more accurate to view the decision as reflecting a view that there is no
corporate veil in the first place. Viewing the corporation as an association of
shareholders eliminates the separation between the corporation and its shareholders. 85
Although piercing the corporate veil is “limited to rare cases involving fraud and
abuse,” 86 viewing the corporation as an “association of shareholders” is not a legal
remedy, rather it reflects an existential view of the corporation.87
Piercing the corporate veil is a legal remedy that rectifies some wrong
perpetrated by shareholders through their improper use of the corporate form.88 The
wrongdoing by shareholders that leads to piercing may take the form of
undercapitalizing the corporation, failing to observe corporate formalities,
committing fraud, paying illegal dividends, or making other prohibited distributions
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on the eve of bankruptcy.89 In sharp contrast, conceptualizing the corporation as an
association of shareholders does not require any wrongdoing by shareholders. In fact,
it does not require any action by shareholders at all. Indeed, conceptualizing the
corporation as an association of shareholders, as was done in Citizens United, does
not require that any shareholder even be aware that the corporation is doing anything.
Thus, it is inaccurate to equate the treatment of the corporation as an association of
individuals with the corporate law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.
More generally, the limited remedies of other constituencies against
stockholders also undercut the associational model. Consistent with the counterparty
argument, when workers and debtholders do not have their promises honored, they
generally have to rely upon the entity, not stockholders, for relief. Piercing the veil is
one example of how difficult it is to clawback against equity,90 but so too are
fraudulent conveyance laws, which are not easy to use.91 This illustrates another point
about using models as a way of examining how corporations work and why they
should function in certain ways, as opposed to objective law. Under arguments about
residual claimants, the simplifying assumption is that legal claimants get paid first.
But of course, that assumption, which assumes no pie gets eaten until a final feast, is
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wrong. All the time there are transfers to equity, and if down the line, those transfers
do not leave enough to feed the others, the others generally have to look just to the
entity, not the stockholders, to be made whole. This is because the entity is by law a
unique person, not an association of its stockholders.
B. Not So Special: Stockholders Are At Most Fellow Contract Claimants,
Not Corporate Owners
As significantly, shareholders are not owners of the corporations in which they
own shares. Rather, they are merely owners of investment contracts that give them
certain contractual claims on the cash flows generated by the corporation. As a matter
of logic, the corporation is a legal person, and it does not have owners any more than
natural persons have owners. The notion that shareholders own the corporations in
which they have invested is a myth.92 The fact of the matter is that shareholders’
rights sound in contract not in property. Shareholders have contractual rights to vote
for directors, though voting rights may be skewed by contract so as effectively to
deprive the majority of shareholders of the right to vote. Shareholders have no right
to enter corporate property or to command that corporate resources be allocated or not
allocated in any particular way. Even shareholders’ rights to the cash flows generated
by the firm are highly ephemeral. Shareholders are entitled to dividends if and when
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the corporation’s boards of directors exercise their virtually unfettered discretion to
declare a dividend.
Certainly conceptions of property have moved beyond the strict view often
attributed to Blackstone that defined property as “that sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”93 But even under the
more modern view that property rights are not absolute, those claiming a property
interest in something must have a claim of dominion and control more substantial than
do shareholders. Certain legal realists and their intellectual heirs have defined
ownership rights as consisting of a “bundle of rights.”94 But even under this expansive
view of property rights,95 the meager bundle accorded to shareholders, which does not
include any rights to enter, much less to possess property or to allocate property in
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any way, is not sufficiently broad to sustain an assertion that shareholders somehow
are owners. Clearly they are not.
Shareholders, for example, have no ability, even collectively, to determine
executive compensation.

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer

Protection Act of 2010 was thought to expand shareholder rights considerably because
it contained a provision requiring that shareholders be allowed to cast a purely
precatory, advisory vote on executive compensation at least once every three years.
These votes, colloquially called “say-on-pay” ballots, are non-binding and do not
create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties governing corporate directors’
conduct under applicable state laws.
Recognizing shareholders for what they are, which is mere contractual counterparties with the firms in which they have invested, undermines the romantic notion
that corporations are associations of shareholders. For example, one would imagine
that if shareholders were in fact members of an association of shareholders in the
companies in which they have invested, then they would be permitted at the very least
to communicate with one another in a free and unfettered way. But this is not the
case. Shareholder communication with other shareholders, while possible, is strictly
regulated, and it appears that the Securities and Exchange Commission has virtually
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unfettered rights to regulate corporate communications. 96 Thus, the notion that
corporations are “associations of shareholders” is further undermined by the fact that
shareholders lack even the most basic associational rights.
III.

The Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Corporate Entity in Other
Areas of Law

In this section we demonstrate that treating the corporation as an association of
individuals is a radical, existential assertion about the nature of the corporation, and
one that is counter-factual and at odds with the foundational principles of American
corporate law. The following sections demonstrate the spuriousness of treating
corporations as associations of individuals by showing how they interact with several
core doctrines of corporate law and federal jurisdiction.
Put even more starkly, we show that in almost every other area of jurisprudence,
the Supreme Court has accepted the conception of the corporation that we advance in
this article.

To wit, the Supreme Court generally accepts the conception of

corporations as being established by the state laws which create them. In deciding
cases before it, the Supreme Court does not theorize about associations of
stockholders or nexuses of contracts, it accepts the perhaps mundane, but profoundly
important and true, fact that legal reality drives corporate reality. That is, in other
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contexts, as distinguished commentators have also noted,97 the Supreme Court hews
to the view of the corporation that we have argued is required by the state laws that
establish business corporations in our nation.
A. The Basics: A Corporation Cannot Proceed Pro Se Through a
Stockholder or Officer
An early and seemingly mundane, but important, example, deals with whether
a corporation, like a human being, may represent itself in court “pro se.” Because a
corporation is not identifiable with any of its human constituents, be they stockholders
or managers, the Supreme Court in an early case and consistent with English law on
the point, recognized that “a corporation, it is true, can appear only by attorney, while
a natural person may appear for himself.”98
In other areas dealing with standing, the Supreme Court has refused to allow
stockholders to ignore the corporate form. When the sole stockholder of a small
corporation tried to sue Domino’s Pizza for refusing to contract with his corporation,
allegedly because he was black, the Supreme Court found against him stating:
It is fundamental corporation and agency law—indeed it can be said to
be the whole purpose of corporation and agency law—that the
shareholders and contracting officer of a corporation has no rights and is
exposed to no liability under the corporation’s contracts.99
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Or as the Supreme Court said in a case dealing with a parent corporation
attempting to complain about the Interstate Commerce Commission’s denial of permit
for its subsidiary, “[o]ne who has created a corporate arrangement, chosen as a means
of carrying out his business purpose, does not have the choice of disregarding the
corporate entity in order to avoid the obligations which the statute lays upon it for the
protection of the public.”100
B. Diversity Jurisdiction
Treating the corporation as an association of shareholders is inconsistent with
the well understood legal rule that corporations are separate juridical entities in their
own right for purposes of establishing jurisdiction for federal courts on the grounds of
diversity of citizenship. Federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 affords
jurisdiction to federal courts in disputes that involve more than $75,000 and in which
there is “complete diversity,” which means that no defendant can be a citizen of any
state of which a plaintiff is a citizen.
It is hard to imagine a clearer statement of the proposition that corporations are
not “associations of shareholders” than 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), the federal diversity
jurisdiction statute, which provides that “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen
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of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its
principal place of business.” 101
In Hertz Corp. v. Friend,102 lawyers brought a class action suit against Hertz in
a California state court on behalf of certain residents of California. Hertz moved to
remove the case to a California federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs argued that there was no diversity jurisdiction as Hertz’s principal place
of business was California and not Florida. The federal district court agreed and
remanded the case to the state court.103 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal district court holding that the district court correctly
applied the “place of operations test” and concluded that Hertz’s principal place of
business was California and consequently diversity jurisdiction did not exist and the
case could not be brought in federal court. 104 The Supreme Court in Hertz held that
the phrase principal place of business in § 1332(c)(1) “refers to the place where the
corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s
activities,” or its “nerve center,” which “will typically be found at [its]
headquarters.” 105 Business organizations that are viewed as associations of their
investors, including partnerships, limited partnerships, and LLCs have been
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determined by courts to be citizens of the states in which the organization’s partners
or members are citizens.106 Thus, the Court’s decision in Hertz v. Friend and indeed
the federal diversity of citizenship statute itself is inconsistent with the “association of
stockholders” view of the corporation reflected in Citizens United. Logically, if a
corporation were an association of shareholders, then the corporation would be present
wherever the shareholders resided. Because shareholders of large publicly held
corporations generally reside in all fifty states, this would undermine the plain
meaning of the federal diversity of citizenship statute for corporations.
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WRIGHT & MILLER, 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3630.1 (3d ed.) (“[T]he Supreme
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diversity jurisdiction exists). But see MCP Trucking, LLC v. Speedy Heavy Hauling, Inc., Civ.
Act. No. 14-CV-02427-PAB, 2014 WL 5002116 (D. Col. Oct. 6, 2014) (denying jurisdictional
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No. 4:08-CV-87 CAS, 2008 WL 341664 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 5, 2008) (denying motion for discovery).
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C. Corporate Taxation and Corporate Restructuring
In the world of business, as a general rule, juridical entities pay taxes and
associations of investors do not. Since 1909, corporate income has been subject to a
federal tax. This income is typically taxed a second time when it is distributed as
dividends that are liable to the individual income tax. The corporate income tax
reflects the view that a corporation is a legal entity separate and distinct from its
shareholders.
Under certain circumstances it is possible to organize a corporation under
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code requirements. Subchapter S gives
corporations with 100 or fewer shareholders that meet certain other requirements the
limited liability benefit of incorporation while allowing them to be taxed as
associations of members such as partnerships. The ability of the state to waive the
taxes imposed on corporate entities does not undermine our argument that the
existence of corporate income tax indicates that corporations are juridical entities
separate and apart from their shareholders. After all, individuals who earn less than a
certain minimum income are exempt from the income tax, but such an exemption does
not render such people non-entities.
Rather, the system of Subchapter S reflects another manifestation of our core
premise: corporations as a factual matter depend on legal authorization and are
historically subject to legislation tailored to the unique issues that flow from their
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status as distinct legal persons. As we continue to explain, the Supreme Court has
long recognized this reality, and allowed legislators wide leeway to regulate the
conduct of their powerful creators.
Thus, in applying the tax laws, the Supreme Court has made clear that neither
the government nor stockholders may ignore the corporate form.

In Moline

Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,107 a stockholder who owned all the stock of the
corporation attempted to ignore the corporate form and be taxed directly on a
corporate transaction, to his economic benefit. The Supreme Court did not oblige. In
United States v. Cumberland Service Co., 108 the government was the party seeking to
ignore the separate legal existence of the corporation and treat the stockholders as the
parties subject to tax. The Supreme Court was not sympathetic and adhered to a
consistent view: under the state laws that create corporations, they are separate entities
from those who own their equity.
Similarly, the way that corporate governance changes when a corporation
becomes insolvent undercuts associational claims. If the corporation is an association
of individuals in part for expressive purposes, it is strange that if the entity becomes
insolvent, most of the governance rights of the stockholders can be defeased. 109 Under

107

319 U.S. 436 (1943).
338 U.S. 451 (1950).
109
See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101–02 (Del.
2007) (noting that a corporation’s “creditors take the place of the shareholders as the residual
beneficiaries of any increase in value” and therefore “have standing to bring derivative claims
108

55

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118

corporate law itself, upon insolvency, the focus of the equitable duties of the directors
shifts to preserving the value of the entity for the benefit of another input—the
debtholders.110 These debtholders, of course, are in reality extant before insolvency,
and under the law, have to be paid first. Yet, they spring into greater life only when a
company cannot pay its bills. In insolvency, therefore, would the Citizens United
majority consider the entity an association of debtholders?
D. Corporate Criminal Liability
The existence of corporate criminal liability is also inconsistent with the
assertion in Citizens United that corporations are associations of shareholders rather
than distinct juridical entities. It is established that a corporation is “criminally liable
for the federal crimes its employees or agents commit in its interest.”111 Corporate
officers, employees, and agents are individually liable for the crimes they commit, for
the crimes they conspire to commit, for the foreseeable crimes their coconspirators

against directors on behalf of the corporation for breaches of fiduciary duties”); In re Potter
Instrument Co., 593 F.2d 470, 474–75 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s decision
to deny a major shareholder’s petition for a special meeting to elect new directors because the
“election might result in unsatisfactory management and would probably jeopardize both [the
corporation’s] rehabilitation and the rights of creditors and stockholders”); cf. Lynn M. LoPucki
& William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 127–30 (1990) (noting shareholders’
limited ability to object to a plan under the Bankruptcy Code’s “cram down” provisions).
110
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commit, for the crimes whose commission they aid and abet, and for the crimes whose
perpetrators they assist after the fact.
The existence of corporate criminal liability is an example of the corporation
being considered a legal person. At common law, corporations were viewed as
incapable of committing crimes.

For example, according to Blackstone, “a

corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime, in its corporate capacity;
though its members may, in their distinct individual capacities.”112 Thus the view that
corporations cannot commit crimes is rooted in a conception of corporations as
“associations of shareholders.” Once the corporation came to be perceived as a
distinct juridical entity, courts recognized that corporations could be criminally liable
for first for “failure to honor certain legal obligations (nonfeasance); then for the
inadequate manner in which it performed certain legal obligations (malfeasance).” 113
By the early 20th century, the idea of a corporation as a juridical entity had
become firmly entrenched and the Supreme Court officially recognized corporate
criminal liability in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States:
It is true that there are some crimes which, in their nature, cannot be
committed by corporations. But there is a large class of
offenses . . . wherein the crime consists in purposely doing the things
prohibited by statute. In that class of crimes we see no good reason why
corporations may not be held responsible for and charged with the
knowledge and purposes of their agents, acting within the authority
conferred upon them. If it were not so, many offenses might go
112
113

1 BLACK. COMM., 476.
Id.
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unpunished and acts be committed in violation of law where, as in the
present case, the statute requires all persons, corporate or private, to
refrain from certain practices, forbidden in the interest of public
policy.114
The reference in Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. to corporations as
corporate “persons” is wholly inconsistent with the conception in Citizens United.
Contemporary corporate criminal law is modeled on individual criminal law, and is
rooted in notions of personal responsibility:
Substantive bases of liability, evidence, procedure and rationale have
been constructed initially for individuals. Over the years, doctrine has
been transposed to corporations. The model contains two features. One
is an identification of persons as the subjects of criminal law. The other
feature is an assumption that the elements of criminal law applicable to
individuals also apply to all persons. . . . [P]redominant practice remains
individualistic: corporations are treated as persons in the way that
individuals are treated.115
Thus, corporate criminal liability uniformly treats culpable entities as
individuals, not as associations of persons. Corporate criminal law requires that the
corporation be an entity.116 Treating the corporation as an association of individuals
would require either abandoning the notion of corporate criminal responsibility or it
would require assigning such responsibility to the “associations of citizens” who
constitute the corporation.

212 U.S. 481, 494‒95 (1909).
Steven Walt & Wililiam S. Laufer, Why Personhood Doesn’t Matter: Corporate Criminal
Liability and Sanctions, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263 (1991).
116
Id. at 264.
114
115
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The Supreme Court also has refused the plea of someone who owned all the
stock of a corporation to quash a subpoena directed towards the corporation. That
singular equity owner attempted to assert his own privilege under the Fifth
Amendment to stop the government from procuring information from the corporation
he dominated and controlled. The Supreme Court refused to allow his claim that the
corporation was indistinct from him, stating in Braswell v. United States, “petitioner
asserts no self-incrimination claim on behalf of the corporations; it is well established
that such artificial entities are not protected by the Fifth Amendment.” 117
Braswell was no novelty; it built on longstanding case law denying corporations
the ability to assert Fifth Amendment rights, while allowing their officers and
stockholders to do so in their personal capacities. 118 The Court has also recognized
that the corporation is distinct from its officers and stockholders in applying
substantive criminal statutes, such as RICO. In Cedric Kushner Promotions Ltd v.
King, for example, the Supreme Court held that the president and only stockholder of
a corporation was a different “person” from the corporate enterprise under the RICO
statute. 119

117

487 U.S. 99, 102 (1988).
See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944);
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (applying same concept of distinctiveness to deny a
partnership the ability to assert Fifth Amendment privilege).
119
533 U.S. 158, 160 (2001) (“[W]e conclude that the ‘person’ and ‘enterprise’ here are distinct
and that the RICO provision applies.”).
118
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And the punishments meted out to corporations highlight the distinct nature of
a corporation from a human—corporate criminal law takes seriously the distinction
and therefore the punishment scheme is far different.120 There have been many
situations where corporations have in fact caused death or mass destruction.121 If the
same conduct were committed by a human being, she might have been executed, or
as fatal from a business perspective, “incapacitated” by incarceration for decades.
Corporations are not treated this way.
They “live” on. For instance, because of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in
2010, BP pled guilty to felony manslaughter and was fined $4 billion.122 Yet only 7

120

For instance, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual has a specific, separate section for the
“Sentencing of Organizations.” U.S.S.G. Ch. 8. Unlike the rest of the Sentencing Guidelines,
which focus on determining the amount of prison time to sentence an individual to based on the
level of the crime and any mitigating or criminal history, the “Sentencing of Organizations”
chapter focuses on fines, remedies for the harm, special assessments, and forfeitures. Id.
121
E.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Penalizing Punitive Damages: Why the Supreme Court Needs a
Lesson in Law and Economics, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 813–14 (2010) (documenting the
environmental costs of the Exxon Valdez spill that, although it did not cause any human deaths,
harmed the Alaska ecosystem for decades); Josh Barbanel, Fatal Explorer Accidents Involving
Bad
Tires
Soared
in
‘99,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
19,
2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/19/business/fatal-explorer-accidents-involving-bad-tiressoared-in-99.html (“52 people died in 40 fatal crashes of Explorers in which police reports listed
tire problems as a contributing factor . . . [and] the trend could have been detected long before, if
officials had used the federal fatality data as an early-warning system to identify possible
manufacturing defects.”).
122
See Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, BP Exploration and Production Inc. Agrees to Plead
Guilty to Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes, and Obstruction of Congress Surrounding
Deepwater Horizon Incident (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bp-exploration-andproduction-inc-agrees-plead-guilty-felony-manslaughter-environmental.
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years later, in 2017, BP’s revenues exceeded $240 billion, 123 despite the fact that a
human convicted of federal voluntary manslaughter would likely still be incarcerated
and unable to earn a living during incarceration.124 If a corporation’s human agents
acted with the requisite mens rea, they can be imprisoned or executed.125 But notably,
these human agents are not the stockholders, typically, but managers. The criminal
law has a distinct regime of punishment for these human actors. This distinction
between corporations and flesh-and-blood human beings in the high-stakes area of
criminal law is important and further supports our thesis.
IV. The Core Assertion in Citizens United Is at Odds with Law and
Empirical Fact: Shareholders in Corporations Are Not Associated with
Each Other
A frustrating aspect of Citizens United is that the core concept—that
corporations are associations of shareholders—is never developed in the opinion. It
stands as a mere assertion. Here, we consider the extent to which this assertion is an
accurate description of the corporation.

The notion in Citizens United that

corporations are associations of shareholders reflects the view that corporate
123

BP
Annual
Report,
Form
20-F,
at
125,
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/investors/bp-annual-report-and-form-20f2017.pdf
124
Voluntary manslaughter carries a base offense level of 29, resulting in a recommended sentence
of between 87 and 108 months, based on an offender with no criminal history and no downward
departures. See U.S.S.G. § 2A.1.3.
125
See, e.g., Press Release, Department of Justice, Former Enron Chief Financial Officer Andrew
Fastow Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Commit Securities and Wire Fraud, Agrees to Cooperate
with Enron Investigation (Jan. 14, 2004), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/pressreleases/former-enron-chief-financial-officer-andrew-fastow-pleads-guilty-to-conspiracy-tocommit-securities-and-wire-fraud (Fastow sentenced to 10 years in prison for his plea).
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shareholders have something in common, but there is nothing in the actual, real world
relationship among corporate shareholders that suggests that this is the case.
Corporate law scholars of all persuasions, but particularly those associated
with the political right, have long been suspicious of arguments that corporate
managers should be allowed to use corporate funds for non-business purposes, such
as for advancing pet causes or political views. 126 In fact, Justice Scalia made this
point succinctly at a stage in his jurisprudence earlier than Citizens United when he
said, “[t]he Campbell Soup Company does not exist to promote a message.” 127
A principal concern among those taking this accepted position is that
stockholders are in fact weak in comparison to the managers of corporations, and
poorly positioned to constrain them even when it comes to central issues, such as the
nature of the company’s profit making strategy and executive compensation. 128
They, therefore, argued that managers should be required to focus, within the

126

Strine & Walter, Conservative Collision Course, supra note 49, at 346–52 (showing that
conservatives like Hayek, Friedman, Arrow, Easterbrook, Maine, Jensen, Henry Butler, Stephen
Bainbridge, and Roberta Romano all take this view).
127
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 467 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
128
Strine & Walter, Conservative Collision Course, supra note 49, at 352–53; Henry Butler, The
Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 107 n.20 (1989); Henry N
Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate
Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1223–24
(1999) (“Corporate managers have enough trouble meeting the challenges of maximizing
shareholder value without diverting their attention to saving the world.”). See generally MARK
ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
FINANCE (1996).
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boundaries of external law and ethics, solely on increasing the profitability of the
firm, because that was the only common objective of the stockholders and it was
difficult enough to hold managers accountable on that dimension alone. 129 If
managers were instead allowed to act for diffuse purposes, these commentators
viewed them as being freed from accountability, because they could then justify their
actions on so many grounds, that the rights given to stockholders would not be potent
enough to keep them loyal to the stockholders. 130 For stockholders therefore to be
viewed as effective in checking the use of corporate funds for political spending,
requires assuming away long accepted realities held by most corporate law
commentators, especially those coming at the question from a conservative
perspective.

129

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 51, at 70 (“[W]hen voters hold dissimilar preferences it
is not possible to aggregate their preferences into a consistent system of choices. . . . [S]ingleobjective firms are likely to prosper relative to others. This suggests . . . why the law makes no
effort to require firms to adhere to any objective other than profit maximization (as constrained by
particular legal rules).”); Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 923, 961 (1984) (pursuit of ends other than profit maximization is “especially disturbing
because profit maximization is the only goal for which we can at least theoretically posit
shareholder unanimity”); see also Strine & Walter, Conservative Collision Course, supra note 49,
at 351–52 (collecting sources highlighting that investors’ only common trait is a focus on returns).
130
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1191–92 (1981) (“A manager responsible
to two conflicting interests is in fact answerable to neither.”); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic
Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 32 (1991) (“[T]he primary beneficiaries of
nonshareholder constituency statutes are incumbent managers, who can justify virtually any
decision they make on the grounds that it benefits some constituency of the firm.”) (emphasis
omitted).
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The reason all commentators agree is that there is no empirical basis on which
to assume that the stockholders of a business corporation have any common interest
other than obtaining a good return on their investment. Put simply, their only shared
interest is profiting on their stock investment. For that reason, many conservative
corporate law scholars have argued that corporate directors should be required to
focus solely on advancing the best interests of stockholders, within the bounds of the
law and ethics, as they have no legitimate basis for using corporate funds for any
purpose unrelated to generating profits. If there is surplus that can be used for that
purpose, these commentators argue that it ought to be returned to the stockholders
themselves, who can then use it individually and legitimately for their own purposes,
which might include advancing the diverse charitable and political causes they
support. 131 Citizens United ignored the reality that no corporate law scholars or
practitioners take the position that stockholders invest in the stock of business
corporations for expressive purposes.
As important, Citizens United ignored another undeniable reality about public
business corporations: most of their investors are not human beings who can at least
be plausibly thought to have joined together for associational reasons unrelated to

131

MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 135 (2002).
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profit, albeit through the strange means of co-investing in a for-profit business. 132
Contrary to the inference in Citizens United, the vast majority of shares in U.S. public
corporations—approximately 80%—are primarily owned by institutions, such as
pension funds and mutual funds.133 These institutional investors are organized as
separate juridical entities (corporations, LLCs, LLPs, LPs, and statutory trusts). Most
shareholders are not individuals. And the institutions and individuals who own shares
are not “associated” with each other in any meaningful sense.

132

Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1521–22 (2007) (the
concentration of equity ownership in the hands of a few large institutional investors has “created
a class of shareholders singularly focused on shareholder value”).
133
Charles McGrath, 80% Of Equity Market Cap Held By Institutions, Pensions & Investments,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Apr. 25, 2017, 11:45 AM), http://www.pionline.com/article/
20170425/INTERACTIVE/170429926/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-by-institutions; see also
Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1922
(2013).
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Corporations are comprised of a mix of passive and active investors. And as
Roberta Romano has shown, these institutional investors are riddled with conflicts of
interest that undermine the assumption that shareholders are an association or
community in any sense of the word.134 Managers of corporate pension funds and
financial institutions have other business relations with the companies in which they
own shares, and those relationships generate conflicts of interest that prevent them
from opposing corporate management. 135 Public pension funds (the pension funds of
state and local government employees) are similarly riddled with conflicts.136 And
the conflicts among the various groups of shareholders is acute. Discrete shareholder
groups will have idiosyncratic preferences over almost every conceivable issue from
environmental issues, plant re-locations and closings, in-state employment, and
leveraged buyouts,137 to name but a few.
What is common about all of these institutional investors is that almost none of
them have the capital of human, end-user investors because those investors have
chosen to give it to them to join an association of investors committed to a common

134

Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993); John Brooks, Corporate Pension Fund Asset Management, in
Twentieth Century Fund, ABUSE ON WALL STREET: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE SECURITIES
MARKETS 224 (1980).
135
Brooks, supra note 134, at [NTD: ADD PINCITE].
136
See Romano, supra note 134, at 799–839.
137
See id. at 807 (describing an episode in which the Illinois state treasurer threatened to withhold
investments by the state pension fund in a leveraged buyout fund if the buyout firm did not ensure
that an in-state printing plant continued to operate without reduced employment).
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set of social or political values. 138 These funds, however, do not advertise themselves
as vehicles for political expression, and have their own agency problems. To wit,
some of them vote their stock on stockholder proposals without reference to their
stated values and instead just vote with all the other funds in the fund complex. 139
Most investors save to pay for two things: college for their children and retirement for
themselves. As to each, Americans are, by dint of economic pressures and tax
incentives, required to give over their wealth to institutional investors. With the
decline of defined benefit pension plans, most Americans have no practical choice but
to give over a substantial portion of their earnings every month to the mutual funds in

138

There is a the small subset of investors who have chosen to invest in so-called socially
responsible mutual funds, which do pick stocks based on criteria like the social responsibility of
the corporations in which the funds invest.
139
By way of observation, in a prior work, one of us looked at the behavior of Vanguard’s FTSE
Social Index Fund, which is marketed to socially conscious investors and only invests in
companies that meet certain social, human rights, and environmental criteria. That investigation
revealed that the Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund is subject to the same voting guidelines that
govern all Vanguard funds and votes identically to other Vanguard funds. Leo E. Strine, Jr.
Making It Easier for Directors to “Do The Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 250 (2014)
(documenting this reality and stating that “there are socially responsible investment funds that
appear to vote their shares in line with all the other funds of their mutual fund family, and to take
no special efforts to vote in a way that is consistent with the fund’s supposed commitment to social
responsibility”). A look at the up-to-date voting data suggests that the FTSE Social Index fund
continues to vote in exactly the same manner as all other Vanguard funds. Compare Vanguard
FTSE Social Index Fund, Form N-PX, Aug. 31, 2017, https://about.vanguard.com/investmentstewardship/supportingfiles/proxyvote0213.pdf?v=1506 522482522, with Vanguard 500 Index
Fund,
Form
N-PX,
Aug.
31,
2017,
https://about.vanguard.com/investmentstewardship/supportingfiles/proxyvote0040.pdf?v=15065
22482519; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE
L.J. 1870, 1914 n.150 (collecting sources showing that multiple institutional investors vote as a
complex).
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the menu selected for them by their employer.140 These investments must remain with
institutions until the worker is near retirement age, at the price of a severe tax
penalty.141 Most workers cannot choose individual companies but must as a practical
matter give their money to a mutual fund.142
As a result of this incentive system, it is now the case that five to ten mutual
funds control a large percentage of the stock in American public companies.143 For
instance, “[i]n 2015 the Big Three [BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street] together
constituted the largest owner of nearly 90% of public companies in the S&P 500.”144

140

Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees
and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1485 (2015) (“The menu of mutual
funds from which employees choose is ultimately constructed by the employer . . . .”). “In the
largest 200 defined contribution plans, the average number of funds on the menu is twenty-two.”
William A. Birdthistle, EMPIRE OF THE FUND 143 (2016).
141
I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(i) (distributions from 401(k)s cannot be made until the employee attains
the age of 59 ½); id. at § 72(t)(1) (“If any taxpayer receives any amount from a qualified retirement
plan . . . the taxpayer’s tax under this chapter for the taxable year in which such amount is received
shall be increased by an amount equal to 10 percent . . .”).
142
Ayres & Curtis, Beyond Diversification, supra note 140, at 1485 (“The most common type of
investment options in 401(k) plans are mutual funds or similar investment vehicles that pool funds
managed by a professional fund manager.”). One important reason investment options are
restricted is the structure of the liability safe harbor that plan sponsors can take advantage of by
offering only certain investments. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1.
143
Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 498–99
(2018) (“From 1980 to 1996, large institutional investors nearly doubled their share of ownership of
U.S. corporations from under 30% to over 50%. By 2010, institutional investors held approximately
80% of the U.S. stock market. . . . Mutual funds have been the largest drivers of this growth: in 1980,
they owned $70 billion in assets, and in 2009, that number was up to $7.2 trillion. ”).
144
Id. at 509 (“[T]he passive fund industry is remarkably concentrated—BlackRock, Vanguard, and
State Street (the “Big Three”) together hold 70% of the ETF market. Index fund market share data
are not publically available, but recent estimates put Vanguard as holding 75% of the market. As a
result of the growth of passive investing, the Big Three have become significant players in
governance.”).
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None of these mutual funds pretend that the funds they receive result from the desire
of their worker-investors to empower the mutual fund to engage in speech or advance
good causes on their behalves. In fact, major institutional investors recognize that the
only common interest of their investors is in a good return, and they assume, rightly,
that they hold funds of investors with widely disparate political and social views and
that the funds cannot reconcile those views in any rational way other than by focusing
the fund solely on getting a solid profit for them from its investing activities.145 And
even as to pension funds that might be affiliated with labor unions or state

145

Likely because their diverse group of investors have different political views, Vanguard
believes that decisions on corporate and social policy should be left up to the board. VANGUARD,
STEWARDSHIP POLICY 11 (2016), https://global.vanguard.com/documents/stewardship-policy.pdf
(“Proposals in this category [i.e., “corporate and social policy issues”], initiated primarily by
shareholders, typically request that the company disclose or amend certain business practices. . . .
[These] proposals may address concerns with which the Board philosophically agrees, but absent
a compelling economic impact on shareholder value (e.g., proposals to require expensing of stock
options), the funds will typically abstain from voting on these proposals. This reflects the belief
that regardless of our philosophical perspective on the issue, these decisions should be the province
of company management unless they have a significant, tangible impact on the value of a fund’s
investment and management is not responsive to the matter.”). Blackrock’s explicit policy is not
to vote on corporate political activities. BLACKROCK, PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES FOR U.S.
SECURITIES 13–14 (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blkresponsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf (“Finally, we believe that it is not the role of
shareholders to suggest or approve corporate political activities; therefore we generally do not
support proposals requesting a shareholder vote on political activities or expenditures.”). Fidelity
and State Street do not have explicit policies. See Yafit Cohn, Political Contributions and
Lobbying,
HARV. CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. BLOG,
(Aug.
18,
2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/08/18/political-contributions-and-lobbying-proposals/
(“Not all large institutional shareholders disclose official positions on political
contributions/lobbying proposals. Fidelity and State Street Global Advisors, for example, do not
expressly discuss such proposals in their proxy voting guidelines.”). But data complied by
Professor Hirst supports the notion that institutional investors routinely vote no or abstain from
votes on corporate political activities. Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP.
L. 217, 244 (2018) (observing that Vanguard did not vote for any political spending resolutions in
2014).
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governments, the fiduciaries do not have free license to use the fund’s investment
capital as they wish. Rather, basic concepts of fiduciary duty and the relevant federal
statute, 146 require that pension trustees focus on prudent investing to generate returns
sufficient to pay the pensioners the pensions due to them. 147
Because of these developments, the long understood reality that the
stockholders of business corporations do not invest for any common interest other
than receiving a good return, and certainly not because of any shared associational
interest in particular political or social goals, has become even more inarguable. The
largest and most influential stockholders of American public companies have names
like Vanguard 500 Index Fund, Fidelity Contrafund, iShares Core S&P 500, and
American Funds Investment Company of America.148 Those names make clear that
those funds are focused on styles of investing designed for one purpose: to generate a
good, risk-adjusted return.

146

See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829, codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq; see also Interpretive Bulletin Relating to
Investing in Economically Targeted Investments, 73 FR 61734-01, 35. (“ERISA’s plain text thus
establishes a clear rule that in the course of discharging their duties, fiduciaries may never
subordinate the economic interests of the plan [participants and beneficiaries] to unrelated
objectives [ ].”).
147
See Paul Brest, Ronald J. Gilson, & Mark A. Wolfson, How Investors Can (and Can’t) Create
Social
Value,
at
*7–8
(ECGI
Working
Paper,
Mar.
2008),
http://www.ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/finalbrestgilsonwolfson.pdf
(“Plan fiduciaries that are subject to ERISA may take ESG considerations into account in making
portfolio decisions only if doing so does not negatively impact investment returns.”).
148
See
The
25
Largest
Mutual
Funds,
MARKET
WATCH
(2018),
https://www.marketwatch.com/tools/mutual-fund/top25largest.
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By contrast, Citizens United was a case the Supreme Court majority used to
change the law as to business corporations but that involved an unusual situation
having nothing in common with the key issues motivating the restriction on corporate
political spending in McCain-Feingold. Citizens United was a non-profit whose
express purpose, by its name, was to “promote the social welfare through informing
and educating the public on conservative ideas and positions on issues, including
national defense, the free enterprise system, belief in God, and the family as the basic
unit of society.”149 Citizens United had an annual budget of around $12 million
collected from individuals and for-profit corporations. 150 Citizens United released a
90-minute documentary that was highly critical of Hillary Clinton, depicting
interviews with political commentators and other interested people. The film was
promoted with advertisements that contained pejorative statements about Senator
Clinton. As a not-for-profit entity with a particular political point of view, Citizens
United’s contributors are hardly representative of the diverse shareholding population
of a large, public, for-profit corporation.151

149

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, Joint Appendix at 10A, 2009 WL 62995 (Jan. 8,
2009) (Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Dec. 21, 2007)).
150
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320.
151
In some of its jurisprudence dealing with entities, the Supreme Court seems tempted to give
greater credence to arguments by closely held business corporations arguing that they should be
able to make claims to constitutional protection, such as in arguing that a corporation’s religious
freedom has been impinged, than it would indulge from a public corporation. See Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that the Affordable Care Act
contraception mandate, as applied to a closely held for-profit corporation, violated the Religious
71
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V.The Supreme Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence Addressing Unions
Supports the Reasonableness of McCain-Feingold’s Approach to Corporate
Speech
The Supreme Court’s failure to take into account these basic facts about the
relationship of stockholders to business corporations is in irreconcilable tension with
another strand of its First Amendment jurisprudence. In the case of labor unions,
where there is much greater reason to think that there may be shared viewpoints
among employees even if they do not all wish to join the union, the Supreme Court’s

Freedom Restoration Act). Even corporate law scholars sympathetic to the notion that all
corporations should be able to advance such claims view it as bad corporate law to use the number
of stockholders as a dividing line for the exercise of rights. Brief for Corporate and Criminal Law
Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 333889. The reason for that is inarguable:
corporate law itself makes no distinction on this ground and there is little basis to believe that the
stockholders of more closely held businesses tend to be more united around a religious or other
non-monetary purpose than those of public corporations. Their argument for the corporate
exercise of rights is simple and different: they contend that corporate boards are elected and have
broad discretion while in office to advance any lawful purpose, unless constrained by the charter
from doing so. Lyman P.Q. Johnson and David K. Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70
BUS. LAW. 1, 10 (2015) (“State corporate law does not require corporations to prioritize profits
over competing considerations. This fact has ramifications that extend far beyond the particular
activities—religious observance—at issue in the Hobby Lobby cases. All business corporations
(and non-profits too, for that matter) must generate profit in order to survive. That is simply a fact
of life. But corporate law confers on [boards] broad discretion to determine the extent to which
they choose to temper the pursuit of profit by regard for other values.”). But see Stephen M.
Bainbridge, A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga Wood, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 4–5 (2014) (“The law thus has long recognized
William Klein’s point that, despite the utility of the fiction of corporate legal personhood, it is
critical to remember that treating the corporation as an entity separate from the people making it
up bears no relation to economic reality.”). They do not conflate the corporation with its
stockholders or view it as an association of them. Rather, these scholars just believe corporations,
although distinct from their human constituents, should have all the rights of human beings, while
recognizing that they do not have all of the obligations that come from being a human citizen.
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focus has been on ensuring that no worker in a union workplace has her dues used
by the union for any form of political speech.
This jurisprudence—restricting unions from using dues for political
purposes—arose because collective bargaining agreements often contain “agency
shop” clauses, which require each employee to pay union dues. 152 In Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, the Court addressed whether agency shop clauses
violated “the constitutional rights of government employees who object to publicsector unions as such or to various union activities financed by the compulsory
service fees.” 153 Adopting the view that freedom of association includes “refusing
to associate,” the Supreme Court took the view that the dues of union members could
not be used to fund political expenditures, but only the costs of collective bargaining
and representing workers in disputes with the employer. 154 To the extent the union
wished to act as a collective action mechanism for speech—an association for
speech, to use the linguistics of the Citizens United majority 155—it had to

152

See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 212 (1977).
Id. at 211.
154
Id. at 233–36 (“We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for the
expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other
ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative. Rather, the
Constitution requires only that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or assessments
paid by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing
so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental employment.”).
155
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356 (“Yet certain disfavored associations of citizens—those that
have taken on the corporate form—are penalized for engaging in the same political speech.”).
153
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specifically solicit donations from members for that purpose or otherwise run afoul
of the First Amendment. 156 And as to non-union members in the workplace, the
union could only demand a payment that could be directly traced to “collective
bargaining activities.” 157
In adopting McCain-Feingold’s provisions requiring corporations to act
through PACs using only the voluntary contributions of stockholders, rather than
treasury funds, Congress took into fair account accepted principles of corporate law,
which recognized that stockholders in business corporations did not buy stock so
their entrusted capital could be used for political speech. Indeed, in recognizing that
reality, Congress also borrowed from the Supreme Court’s own concern about
compelled speech, as exemplified in Abood and its progeny. 158 Even less than fellow
workers, fellow stockholders cannot be plausibly deemed, by virtue of simply
investing in the same stock, to have any shared political interests, much less to be

156

Abood, 431 U.S. at 233–36.
Id. at 236.
158
See Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 269–74 (1981) (reasoning on the basis of Abood that a requirement
that corporations use separate segregated funds, raised by stockholder solicitation of others, rather
than corporate assets, would be constitutional); Strine, Corporate Power Ratchet, supra note 167,
at 451 (“In McCain-Feingold, Congress actually took an approach to corporate political activity
that was consistent with the Supreme Court’s own reasoning in Abood. . . . McCain-Feingold gave
strong consideration to the expressive rights of stockholders not to have corporations use corporate
funds for political purposes without their consent, just as the Supreme Court had given primacy in
Abood and other cases to the right of workers not to have their dues used for political purposes
without their consent.”).
157
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said to be associated for the purpose of using the corporation as a shared vehicle for
political expression.
But in the past decade, members of the Supreme Court began to express the
view that even requiring a non-union member to contribute to core collective
bargaining costs violated the First Amendment because it compelled the non-union
member to contribute to speech he did not support. 159 These vocal expressions
almost seemed to solicit the aptly named case of Janus v. American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31, 160 which was decided just this
year. In Janus, the Supreme Court overturned the aspect of Abood and its progeny
that allowed unions to compel employees to fund activities associated with collective
bargaining but allowed members to opt-out of funding the union’s political activities,
and held that the First Amendment gave a non-union employee a right to decline to
pay anything at all to the union, even for the costs of bargaining for a raise that would
benefit all employees and even though the union was bound by law to represent all
employees in the workplace. 161 That is, under Abood, employees who declined to

159

See Friedrichs v. California Teachers Assn., 136 S.Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam); Harris v.
Quinn, 134 S.Ct. 2618 (2014); Knox v. Service Employees, 132 S.Ct. 2277 (2012); see also Janus
v. Am. Fed. Of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2487 (2018)
(“Today, the Court succeeds in its 6–year campaign to reverse Abood.”) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
160
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
161
Id. at 2486 (“Neither an agency fee nor any other payment to the union may be deducted from
a nonmember’s wages, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the
employee affirmatively consents to pay. By agreeing to pay, nonmembers are waiving their First
Amendment rights, and such a waiver cannot be presumed. Rather, to be effective, the waiver
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join the union that was designated to conduct collective bargaining on their behalf
were not assessed full union dues but must instead only pay what was known as an
“agency fee.” 162 In overturning Abood, the Janus Court found that “[f]orcing free
and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable raises serious
First Amendment concerns.” 163 Janus involved an Illinois law that required public
employees to pay fees to subsidize a public employee union, even if they chose not to
join and objected to the positions the union took in collective bargaining and related
activities. This law was held to violate the free speech rights of nonmembers of the
union by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public
concern.

must be freely given and shown by ‘clear and compelling’ evidence. Unless employees clearly
and affirmatively consent before any money is taken from them, this standard cannot be met.”)
(citations omitted); id. at 2487 (Kagan, J. dissenting) (“For over 40 years, Abood struck a stable
balance between public employees’ First Amendment rights and government entities’ interests in
running their workforces as they thought proper. . . . The Court’s decisions have long made plain
that government entities have substantial latitude to regulate their employees’ speech—especially
about terms of employment—in the interest of operating their workplaces effectively. Abood
allowed governments to do just that. While protecting public employees’ expression about nonworkplace matters, the decision enabled a government to advance important managerial
interests—by ensuring the presence of an exclusive employee representative to bargain with. Far
from an ‘anomaly,’ the Abood regime was a paradigmatic example of how the government can
regulate speech in its capacity as an employer.”) (citations omitted).
162
The agency fee was a percentage of the union dues that reflected the portion of union dues
attributable to activities that are “germane to [the union’s] duties as collective bargaining
representative,” but nonmembers could not be required to fund the union’s political and ideological
projects. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235–36. In labor-law parlance, the outlays in the first category are
known as “chargeable” expenditures, while those in the latter are labeled “nonchargeable.”
163
Id. at 2464.
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The same of course is true for shareholders of corporations that make political
contributions. Shareholders in such companies are compelled either to disassociate
from these firms or to subsidize the private speech in which these companies choose
to engage. In fact, the harm of compulsion in campaign expenditures by corporations
validated in Citizens United is, if anything, even more egregious than the extent of the
compulsion in Janus.
In Janus, Mark Janus and his counsel were unable to argue that the union was
using his dues for political speech; under Abood, the union could not do so and was
not doing so. All that the union was able to use the dues for was for the core purpose
of negotiating for higher wages and benefits of its workforce, and representing
members of the workforce in disciplinary proceedings with the employer. If, as the
Supreme Court found, that was not a sufficiently common purpose to allow the use of
Mr. Janus’s funds without running afoul of the First Amendment, it seems
inconceivable how one can rationalize allowing Exxon-Mobil or Walmart to use
corporate funds for political speech when no basis exists to think that their
stockholders have any common political viewpoint or have invested to have them
speak on their behalf. Even less is there a basis for not giving deference to a
congressional statute that allowed Exxon-Mobil and Walmart to act in that capacity,
but only on behalf of those stockholders who affirmatively chose to give them funds
for that purpose.
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Janus is aptly named because the policy concerns that animated the case’s
outcome apply with even more strength to corporations than to unions. For starters,
under Abood, union members were only required to pay for core services that did
not involve political speech, and candidly can be analogized to the stockholders’
shared interests in a profit. Non-union workers would like a raise, just like union
members, and absent in Janus was any indication of refusal by non-union members
to accept increases in benefits secured by their union. As important, stockholders
are no better positioned to escape compelled corporate speech than workers are to
escape union bargaining costs. In fact, on balance escape is harder for ordinary
investors. As a practical matter, American workers cannot avoid participating in
giving their funds to institutional investors or pension funds to save for retirement. 164
None of them do so for expressive purposes. 165 The percentage of Americans who
invest in 401(k) plans is much higher than the percentage of unionized
workplaces. 166 And American investors cannot exit their 401(k) investments, unless

164

Ayres & Curtis, Beyond Diversification, supra note 140, at 1485 (“The menu of mutual funds
from which employees choose is ultimately constructed by the employer” and “[t]he most common
type of investment options in 401(k) plans are mutual funds or similar investment vehicles that
pool funds managed by a professional fund manager.”).
165
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 51, at 70 (investors do not invest for expressive purposes
but rather to realize a return on their investment).
166
As of 2010, over 73 million Americans participated in 401(k)–type plans, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,
STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
361
(2010),
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2011/compendia/statab/131ed/2012-statab.pdf, but
only 14.5 million workers belonged to unions, Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union
Members Summary (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
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they do not wish to save for retirement in a tax-efficient way. 167 Furthermore, the
data would suggest that the amount of compelled speech extracted from a worker by
use of his retirement funds without his consent for political purposes is much greater
than would be extracted in core bargaining costs. 168
For present purposes, what is striking is how sensitive the Supreme Court is
in the case of unions to avoid compelled speech, while ignoring the even stronger
factors that make clear that corporate political speech cannot rationally be deemed

167

I.R.C. § 72(t)(1) (“If any taxpayer receives any amount from a qualified retirement plan . . . the
taxpayer’s tax under this chapter for the taxable year in which such amount is received shall be
increased by an amount equal to 10 percent . . .”); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power
Ratchet: The Courts’ Role in Eroding “We the People’s” Ability to Constrain Our Corporate
Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 423, 444 (2016). Citizen United actually suggested that “if
stockholders did not like the way in which corporations were spending their funds, they could use
the ‘procedures of corporate democracy’ to elect different directors, amend the charter, or file a
derivative suit to challenge the expenditure.” Strine & Walter, Conservative Collision Course,
supra note 49, at 363 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362). But the Court’s theory cannot
be reconciled with a messy reality where stockholders are required to invest their savings in stocks
with little say on which stocks they are invested in. Strine, Corporate Power Ratchet, supra note
167, at 444. Indeed, the practical reality may suggest that a small-government union member may
have better odds at changing union leadership than a shareholder has in changing corporate
governance.
168
The Heritage Foundation, an organization with a vested interest in overstating union dues,
suggests that unions charge average and median compulsory dues of $610 and $523 per year,
respectively. JAMES SHERK, THE HERITAGE FOUND., UNIONS CHARGE HIGHER DUES AND PAY
THEIR OFFICERS LARGER SALARIES IN NON-RIGHT-TO-WORK STATES 4 (2015),
http://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/unions-charge-higher-dues-and-pay-their-officerslarger-salaries-non-right. Vanguard suggests that the average and median 401(k) deferral rate for
employees in the U.S. was 6.8% and 6.0%, respectively. VANGUARD, HOW AMERICA SAVES 7
(2018), http://pressroom.vanguard.com/nonindexed/HAS18_062018.pdf. Even assuming half the
deferral rate, for the median household—making $59,039 per year—that would translate into over
$1,700 per year in 401(k) savings compared to estimated union dues of roughly $600 per year,
nearly 3 times as much. JESSICA L. SEMEGA, KAYLA R. FONTENOT & MELISSA A. KOLLAR, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2016 5 (2017),
http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/demo/P60-259.pdf.
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to involve voluntary consent of the stockholders. 169 Making this inconsistency more
plain is the extent to which the Supreme Court discounted the provisions of McCainFeingold that gave corporations the right to act as a collective action mechanism for
the shared interests of their stockholders in political speech. McCain-Feingold did
so by prohibiting corporations from making expenditures in favor of the election or
defeat of political candidates, except through corporate-sponsored PACs. 170 But the
Citizens United majority said that the PAC exception did not allow corporations the
opportunity to speak politically for two reasons, neither of which makes sense. The
first is cost. In this important area of First Amendment jurisprudence, the Citizens
United majority was concerned that a PAC’s administrative cost, such as keeping
receipts for three years, was prohibitive. 171 The second is that the speech would be
separate—it would come from the PAC, not the corporation: “A PAC is a separate

169

Indeed, the Janus majority cited Citizens United only for the proposition that precedent can be
overturned when the previous decision’s “quality of reasoning” is lacking. See Citizens United,
138 S. Ct. at 2479.
170
52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) (“It is unlawful for . . . any corporation . . . or any labor organization, to
make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any [federal] election . . . or in connection
with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the
foregoing offices . . . .”).
171
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337–38 (“[E]very PAC must appoint a treasurer, forward donations
to the treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons making donations,
preserve receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and report changes to this
information within 10 days. And that is just the beginning. PACs must file detailed monthly
reports with the FEC, which are due at different times depending on the type of election that is
about to occur[.]”) (citations omitted).
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association from the corporation. So the PAC exemption from § 441b’s expenditure
ban, § 441b(b)(2), does not allow corporations to speak.” 172
But the Supreme Court’s reasoning on this score displays an ignorance of
corporate law and structure on a basic level. Most large business corporations rely
on the conception of the corporation we have articulated for an important reason:
they use the ability to create distinct legal entities to pursue different business lines
and opportunities. 173 To say Johnson and Johnson or Exxon-Mobil is to name only
the parent corporation of what is likely many separate corporations or entities. In
order to avoid having their legal identity ignored, each of these subsidiaries must be
accounted for individually and be adequately capitalized. That is a minor and
accepted cost of doing business. 174 The Court overlooked these basic realities in

172

Id. at 337 (“Section 441b is a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact that a PAC
created by a corporation can still speak.”) (citations omitted).
173
Richard Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group,78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605, 606 n.1
(2011) (“In 2010, the one hundred US public companies with the highest annual revenues reported
an average of 245 major subsidiaries, with 114 as the median. Only five reported fewer than five
major subsidiaries.”); see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 106 (1986)
(observing that Cargill “a large privately owned corporation” has “more than 150 subsidiaries in
at least 35 countries”). Indeed, this is not a twenty-first century phenomenon. Professor Eisenberg
observed the trend towards “megasubsidiaries” in the early 1970s. See Melvin A. Eisenberg,
Megasubsidiaries: The Effect of Corporate Structure on Corporate Control, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1577 (1971) (“Due to a number of recent legal and economic developments, a significant portion
of the country’s business assets is now held, not only by corporations, but by massive subsidiary
corporations—megasubsidiaries.”).
174
Society would appreciate the Citizens United conception of a corporation, if implemented
elsewhere, as it would decrease the federal deficit. Because most corporations operate through
subsidiaries, they decrease their U.S. tax obligations. Apple, for instance, “has accumulated more
than $128 billion in profits offshore, and probably much more, that is untaxed by the United States
and hardly touched by any other country.” Jesse Drucker & Simon Bowers, After a Tax
Crackdown, Apple Found a New Shelter for Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017),
81
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treating the broad PAC provisions in McCain-Feingold as leaving corporations
subject to a total speech ban. The Court’s other rationale for that finding—that a
corporate-funded and controlled PAC’s speech would not be the parent’s speech—
is also implausible. Apple’s wholly owned subsidiaries are regarded by the customer
as Apple. No distinction is involved, and none was exacted of corporations by
McCain-Feingold’s requirement that corporations restrict themselves to speaking
through a controlled PAC funded only by voluntary stockholder donations.
The reality is that shareholders in the modern publicly held corporation are
nothing special. Shareholders are no more a part of an “association” than are owners
of any other financial assets part of associations. Generally speaking, shareholders
have no control—indeed they have no say whatsoever—in who buys and sells shares
and thus enters into the assemblage of investors. In modern corporations, “shares
trade on multiple exchanges, the ownership is constantly shifting, and most of the
owners trade under ‘street names’ that make it very hard even for the IRS to know
their true identities.” 175

Justice Kennedy suggested that PAC compliance with

ttps://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/world/apple-taxes-jersey.html. At a 21% tax rate, Apple
would owe the US Treasury over $26 billion if the Citizen United majority’s concept of a
corporation—absent subsidiary—was realized. Most of that $128 billion in offshore profits was
made in the Isle of Jersey, which has a population of about 100,000. ISLE OF JERSEY, CENSUS
(2011), https://www.gov.je/SiteCollectionDocuments/Government%20and%20administration/
R%20Chapter1TotalPopulation%2020120808%20SU.pdf. Each resident of Jersey would have to
purchase over 1,000 iPhones each for that much profit to be realized.
175
Avi-Yonah, supra note 33, at 1046.
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McCain-Feingold “might explain why fewer than 2,000 of the millions of
corporations in this country have PACs.” 176 But the reason corporations struggled to
raise money under McCain-Feingold has nothing to do with the practical hurdles of
setting up a PAC. Rather, corporations failed to raise money from their stockholders
because corporate law scholars have been right for years: corporations are not
associations of individuals, and have no realistic chance of getting stockholders to
voluntarily give money to them for political speech.177 The empirical reality the
Supreme Court missed in Citizens United is that when Exxon-Mobil asked for money,
stockholders did not say yes. 178

176

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 338.
Id. at 338 (observing that few corporate PACs were formed under McCain-Feingold).
178
As Professor Pildes has observed “[i]f an Exxon CEO decided to commit one week of profits
to spending on elections, he would have over $800 million to spend (in the pre-Citizens United
world in 2008, Exxon’s PAC raised only $950,000 in voluntary contributions).” Richard H. Pildes,
Is the Supreme Court a ‘Majoritarian’ Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 113. Most of the
funds likely came from Exxon-Mobil managers subject to implicit employment pressures.
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1489 n.371
(“[C]orporate PACs raise almost all of their money from corporate employees . . .”).
177
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VI.

Corporations are State-Created Legal Fictions

In the previous sections of this Article, we showed that corporations are not
“associations of shareholders” as a descriptive matter. Here we make two related
points.

First, the Court’s statement in Citizens United that corporations are

“associations of citizens” is not supported by citations.179 It is a mere assertion without
support or foundation. Second, and more importantly, we argue that the appropriate
source for determining whether a corporation is an entity or an association of
shareholders is state law. As the Supreme Court pointed out in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America, “state regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities
whose very existence and attributes are a product of state law.” 180 Writing for the
majority, Justice Powell further observed that the entire U.S. “free market system
depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation—except in the rarest situations—
is organized under, and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction, traditionally the
corporate law of the State of its incorporation.”181
The point here is that, absent action by the U.S. Congress, the question of
whether a corporation is an association of shareholders or an entity is a matter of state,
not federal, law. As we have also shown, the Supreme Court itself has long accepted

179

See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356 (stating without citation that corporations are “associations
of citizens”).
180
107 S.Ct. 1637, 1649 (1987).
181
Id. See also Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 84 (1976); Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F. 2d. 406 (D.C. Cir 1990)).
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this fundamental fact in its jurisprudence addressing a myriad of important topics,
including constitutional law. And under state law, as we have shown in this Article,
the corporation is an entity, not an association. The fact that corporations are entities
and not associations of shareholders explains why shareholders enjoy limited liability.
It explains why corporations can enter into contracts and sue and be sued. The entity
theory also explains why corporations are not located in the states in which their
shareholders are citizens, but rather in the states in which their headquarters are
located for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. And the entity theory explains why
corporations face criminal liability for their actions and are responsible for paying
taxes.
Since at least 1841, corporations in the U.S. uniformly have been viewed as
entities under state law in light of the fact that the existential purpose of a corporation
was to allow for the creation of an entity that could transact business in the same way
that natural person would do so.182 Corporations are creatures of state law. Based on
prior practice in the federal courts that accepted this reality, one would have to
conclude that the unsupported assertion in Citizens United that the corporation is not
an entity but an association of shareholders is an application of state law. But an
application of a state law principle so accepted that there was no need to cite prior

182

The People v. Assessors of Watertown, 1 Hill 616, 620-21 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1841).
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authority embracing it. Yet, there is absolutely no support for this stark assertion in
the law of any state, it is instead just a belief statement of five judges.
A. Hybrid Forms of Business Organization
Thus far our Article has focused on two forms of business organization, the
general partnership and the corporation. Because the purpose of this Article is to
explore the existential nature of the corporation and to demonstrate why the
corporation is, in essence, a legal entity and not an association of individuals, we have
found it useful to concentrate on these two modal forms of business organization.
Once one introduces the existence of additional forms of business organization, our
argument becomes stronger. Hybrid forms of business organization such as limited
liability companies (LLCs), limited liability partnerships (LLPs), and limited
partnerships (LPs) have some of the characteristics of an entity/corporation and some
of the characteristics of an association of persons/general partnership. Thus, when
one considers the full range of different types of business organizations, the
corporation can be viewed as located at the extreme pole on a continuum that runs
from clear and unambiguous entities to clear and unambiguous associations of
persons, with LLCs, LLPs and LPs occupying the intermediate space on the
continuum.
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1. The Limited Partnership
The limited partnership form of business organization represents an early
attempt to create a business form that would combine the pass-through tax attributes
of a partnership with the limited liability protections of the corporation. 183 Like
corporations, limited partnerships are creatures of state statutes in that, unlike
partnerships, they are not formed merely by the actions of the owners “carrying on as
co-owners of a business for profit,” but rather by complying with the formation
requirements of a relevant state statute.184
Limited partnerships are comprised of (at least) one general partner, which may
be a corporation or other limited liability entity, and one or more limited partners.185
The general partner has unlimited liability for the contract and tort liabilities of the

183

“Limited partnerships, which were used in the early twentieth century to avoid personal liability
of the partners, became the subject of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act in 1916.” Robert A.
Stein, Strengthening Federalism: The Uniform State Law Movement in the United States, 99 MINN.
L. REV. 2253, 2260 (2015).
184
MACEY, MOLL & HAMILTON, supra note 66, at 841; see also 6 Del. C. § 17-201(a) (“In order
to form a limited partnership, 1 or more persons (but not less than all of the general partners) must
execute a certificate of limited partnership. The certificate of limited partnership shall be filed in
the Office of the Secretary of State . . .”); SAUNDERS, LAND, & VOSS, 4 FOLK ON THE DELAWARE
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 17-208.01 (6th ed) (“The fact that a certificate of limited
partnership is on file with the Secretary of State is notice that the partnership is a limited
partnership.”).
185
6 Del. C. § 17-201(a) (requiring general partners be listed in the certificate of limited
partnership); see also Buchwalter et. al., 68 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM PARTNERSHIP § 557 (“A
limited partnership is a type of partnership composed of one or more general partners who manage
the business and are personally liable for the partnership’s debts, and one or more limited partners
who contribute capital and share in the profits but who take no part in running the business and
incur no liability with respect to partnership obligations beyond their contribution.”).
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limited partnership. 186 The liability of the limited partners is limited to the amount of
their investments, so long as they do not participate in the control of the business to
an extent that triggers liability under the applicable statute, a standard which is
considered threateningly vague by many investors. 187
Generally speaking, limited partners, like shareholders, have no say in the
strategic direction or operation of the business.188 The general partner of the limited
partnership runs the business, although sometimes limited partners have voting rights
that allow them to displace the general partner, a right that is exercised very seldom.
Although statutes generally do not address the question of whether limited
partnerships are separate legal entities, limited partnerships possess a number of
characteristics, particularly limited liability for the obligations of the business, which

186

6 Del. C. § 17-403(b) (“[A] general partner of a limited partnership has the liabilities of a partner
in a partnership that is governed by the Delaware Uniform Partnership Law . . . to persons other
than the partnership and the other partners.”); see also Buchwalter et. al., 68 CORPUS JURIS
SECUNDUM PARTNERSHIP § 557.
187
6 Del. C. § 17-303(a) (“A limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited partnership
unless he or she is also a general partner or, in addition to the exercise of the rights and powers of
a limited partner, he or she participates in the control of the business. However, if the limited
partner does participate in the control of the business, he or she is liable only to persons who
transact business with the limited partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited
partner's conduct, that the limited partner is a general partner.”).
188
Life Care Centers of Am., Inc. v. Charles Town Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 79 F.3d 496, 503 (6th Cir.
1996) (“The modus operandi of limited partnerships is an important reason why the ‘aggregate’
theory of partnerships is not always applicable in this context. Limited partnerships are business
organizations in which the limited partners are precluded by law from participating in the operation
of the partnership.”); Buchwalter et. al., 68 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM PARTNERSHIP § 586
(“Limited partnerships are business organizations in which limited partners are precluded by law
from participating in the operation of the partnership.”).
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suggest that they are separate legal entities.189 In particular, limited partners can seek
to bring derivative lawsuits by or in the right of the entity,190 just as corporate
shareholders can. 191 And the dissociation of a limited (or a general) partner from the
limited partnership does not result in the dissolution of the limited partnership.192 As
such, courts have generally treated limited partnerships organized under the Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act as legal entities distinct from their owners.193 And
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act treats the limited partnership as “an entity
distinct from its partners.”194
Delaware, the leading U.S. state for entity formation, adopts a mixed approach
to limited partnerships. “[B]y statute, the parties to a Delaware limited partnership
have the power and discretion to form and operate a limited partnership ‘in an
environment of private ordering’ according to the provisions in the limited partnership

189

MACEY, MOLL & HAMILTON, supra note 66, at 851; see also SAUNDERS, LAND, & VOSS, 4 FOLK
ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW §17-201.03 (“A limited partnership is a distinct
legal entity separate from its partners. A limited partnership is not a ‘natural person,’ and is a
‘statutory creature not existing at common law.’”) (citations omitted).
190
6 Del. C. § 17-1001 (“A limited partner or an assignee of a partnership interest may bring an
action in the Court of Chancery in the right of a limited partnership to recover a judgment in its
favor if general partners with authority to do so have refused to bring the action or if an effort to
cause those general partners to bring the action is not likely to succeed.”).
191
MACEY, MOLL & HAMILTON, supra note 66, at 851.
192
6 Del. C. § 17-702(a)(2) (“An assignment of a partnership interest does not dissolve a limited
partnership or entitle the assignee to become or to exercise any rights or powers of a partner.”).
193
MACEY, MOLL & HAMILTON, supra note 66, at 851; Hart Holding Co v. Drexel Burnham
Lambert Inc., Civ. A No. 11514, 1991 WL 236228, at *6 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 1991) (“Glencoe, as a
limited partnership, is a distinct legal entity which is separate from its partners.”) (Allen, C.).
194
ULPA § 104(a).
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agreement.”195 A Delaware Limited Partnership “is a creature of both statute and
contract.”196 But although contractual flexibility provides substantial leeway to
modify the relationship, certain statutory formalities, such as filing with the Secretary
of State, must be adhered to for the “Limited Partnership” moniker to attach.197 Most
important, as under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, a Delaware Limited
Partnership is an entity in its own right, distinct from its limited partners. 198
2. The Limited Liability Partnership
The limited liability partnership is a statutory creation based conceptually on
the general partnership. But the enabling statutes that permit the creation of LLPs
provide that the contract and tort liability of partners in LLPs is limited to the amount
of their initial investments, as is the case for shareholders in corporations and for
limited partners in limited partnerships. 199 Because partnership statutes typically
provide that LLPs are partnerships, a state’s general partnership law is generally

195

Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 170 (Del. 2002).
Twin Bridges Ltd. P’ship v. Draper, No. Civ. A 2351-VCP, 2007 WL 2744609 at *9 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 14, 2007).
197
Gotham Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d at 170 (“We have noted that DRULPA [Delaware Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act] embodies “the policy of freedom of contract” and “maximum
flexibility.” DRULPA’s “basic approach is to permit partners to have the broadest possible
discretion in drafting their partnership agreements and to furnish answers only in situations where
the partners have not expressly made provisions in their partnership agreement” or “where the
agreement is inconsistent with mandatory statutory provisions.”).
198
Hart Holding, 1991 WL 236228, at *6.
199
E.g., 6 Del. C. § 17-214(d) (“If a limited partnership is a limited liability limited
partnership, . . . no limited partner of the limited partnership shall have any liability for the
obligations of the limited partnership . . . .”).
196
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applicable to LLPs, absent provisions to the contrary in the foundational LLP
agreement. 200
The applicability of general partnership law to LLPs suggests that, generally
speaking, LLPs are associations of their partners, not entities. Unlike corporations,
the default rule for LLPs is that each partner has a right to participate in the
management of the business. 201 Significantly, in LLPs, the default rule is that a
unanimous vote of the partners is required for the admission of a new partner.202
3. The Limited Liability Company
The limited liability company is a non-corporate business structure whose
equity investors, who are known as “members,” have limited liability for the
contractual and tort obligations of the business, like shareholders in corporations. But
LLCs also have the pass-through tax status of partnerships, and virtually unfettered
flexibility and discretion to organize their corporate governance and internal
operations through intra-firm contracting. 203 As with LPs and LLPs, the primary
reason for forming an LLC is to create a structure that offers investors the corporate
law feature of limited liability and the partnership law feature of pass-through tax
status. The two distinct advantages of the LLC structure are: (1) the fact that there is

200

RUPA §§ 101(5), 102(9).
Id. §§ 401(f), 401(h); UPA § 18(e).
202
UPA § 18(g); RUPA §§ 401(i), 401(b)(3).
203
See 1 FLETCHER, supra note 57, § 20 (The LLC “combin[es] the organization flexibility and
pass-through tax treatment of a partnership with the limited liability protection of a corporation”).
201
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more certainty about the limited liability feature in the LLC than there is in the limited
partnership because involvement by LLC members in the operation of the LLC will
not jeopardize the limited liability status of such active members in the way that such
involvement jeopardizes the limited liability status of limited partners in limited
partnerships; and (2) the tremendous flexibility in the organizational structure of
LLCs. The LLC is a tremendously popular form of business organization, with new
LLCs being formed in the U.S. at twice the rate at which new corporations are being
formed. 204
The corporate form remains the dominant form of business organization for
publicly traded firms, although a small number of LLCs and LPs are publicly traded.205
Venture capital firms eschew the LLC form of business organization, and it is
generally not possible for an LLC to make an initial public offering of securities.
Thus, despite the popularity of LLCs, the corporation remains the dominant form of
business organization for large public enterprises, although this could change in the

204

Rodney Chrisman, LLCs are the New King of the Hill, 15 FORD. J. OF CORP. & FIN. L. 459,
459-462 (2010).
205
Suren Gompstian, The Governance of Publicly Traded LLCs, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan.
5, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/01/05/the-governance-of-publicly-traded-llcs
(counting twenty-two publicly listed LLCs as of 2016); List of Current MLPs & MLP Funds,
MLPA, https://www.mlpassociation.org/mlp-101/list-of-current-mlps (last updated Aug. 3, 2018)
(listing 112 publicly traded limited partnerships as of 2018); Michael J. Mauboussin et al., The
Incredible Shrinking Universe of Stocks, CREDIT SUISSE (Mar. 22, 2017),
http://www.cmgwealth.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/document_1072753661.pdf (recording
3,671 listed companies in 2016).
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future.206 Because of the flexible nature of the LLC, the LLC in its “off the rack”
format is a legal entity.
That said, because of the LLC’s flexible nature, a given LLC may more closely
resemble either a legal entity or an association, depending on how it is structured. In
most states, an LLC may be structured as either “member-managed” or “managermanaged.” 207 In a member-managed LLC, each individual member has the authority
to bind the entity, whereas in a manager-managed LLC, only the managers have the
authority to bind the entity. 208 In this respect, the member-managed LLC corresponds
more to the partnership model, while the manager-managed LLC tends to approximate
the corporate form. By default, Delaware law adopts the member-managed model,
but it also allows the LLC agreement to provide for a manager-managed structure (or
something in between).209 The Court of Chancery has advised it will analogize to
partnership law for standard member-managed LLCs, limited partnership law for
LLCs with a single managing member and other passive, non-managing members,
and corporate law for manager-managed LLCs with corporate features such as a board
of directors.210 It would therefore be easy to imagine that investors could form an LLC

206

Mary Siegel, Publicly-Traded LLCs: The New Kid on the Exchange, 68 S.M.U. L. REV. 885
(2015).
207
1 FLETCHER, supra note 57, § 20.
208
Id.
209
See 6 Del. C. § 18.402 (vesting “the management of a limited liability company . . . in its
members” by default, but allowing for “a limited liability company agreement [to] provide[] for
the management, in whole or in part, of a limited liability company by a manager”).
210
See Obeid v. Hogan, C.A. No. 11900-VCL, slip op. at 11–13 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2016).
93

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118

that so closely resembles a partnership that it would be more accurate to characterize
it as an association than as a separate and discrete entity. At the same time, it would
also be easy to imagine an LLC that squarely fits the entity model. In either case, the
LLC retains the central feature that distinguishes legal entities from associations:
limited liability and a legal identity distinct from those who own its equity.211 By way
of example, members cannot sue in the name of the LLC but must proceed
derivatively, as in corporate law. 212
It should be noted, however, that, as discussed above,213 state law often
explicitly determines whether the LLC has entity status. In Delaware, for example,
the relevant statute provides that a “limited liability company formed under this
chapter shall be a separate legal entity, the existence of which as a separate legal entity
shall continue until cancellation of the limited liability company’s certificate of
formation.”214 As such, it may be the case that, as in Delaware, state law has made a
definitive legal determination about the existential status of a particular form of legal
entity, in which case, of course, no further inquiry would be required.

211

6 Del. C. § 18-106(b); see also CompoSecure, L.L.C. v. CardUX, LLC, 2018 WL 660178, at
*26 (Del. Ch. Feb. 1, 2018) (Laster, V.C.) (“Section 18–106(b) of the Delaware Limited Liability
Company Act (the ‘LLC Act’) recognizes that a duly formed LLC is a legally distinct entity.”).
212
6 Del. C. § 18-1001 (“A member or an assignee of a limited liability company interest may
bring an action in the Court of Chancery in the right of a limited liability company to recover a
judgment in its favor if managers or members with authority to do so have refused to bring the
action or if an effort to cause those managers or members to bring the action is not likely to
succeed.”).
213
See supra TAN XX-XX.
214
6 Del. C. § 18-201.
94

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118

B. Non-Profit Corporations
To this point, we have focused on business entities because they are the
biggest aggregators of wealth and these are the entities likely to have been on
Congress’s mind when it adopted McCain-Feingold. But the corporations for which
it is most justifiable, we suppose, to ignore basic principles of corporate law and
treat as “associations of their stockholders” are non-profit corporations that have as
their primary purpose advancing a particular cause. Corporations like this do exist,
of course, and we do not deny that speaking out on behalf of their causes is central
to their purpose.
But, that centrality does not change the legal facts.

Even non-profit

corporations are distinct from their stockholders, or more typically, their members. 215

215

Laurie Bennett, Who Knew That Cato Had Shareholders?, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2012),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lauriebennett/2012/03/02/who-knew-that-cato-hadshareholders/#4f1b05918932 (“You don’t see 501(c)(3)s with shareholders very often.” (quoting
Jeffrey S. Tenenbaum, chairman of the non-profit practice at Venable LLP) (discussing the Cato
Institute, a non-profit which had shareholders until 2012); e.g.,15 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 5103 (West) (defining members of non-profits to include “[a] shareholder of a corporation, if the
corporation issues shares of stock”); Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporations, PA. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://www.dos.pa.gov/BusinessCharities/Business/Resources/Pages/Pennsylvania-NonprofitCorporations-.aspx (“Nonprofit corporations are those corporations whose members or
shareholders may not receive any of the pecuniary [monetary] profits of the corporation.”);
MARILYN E. PHELAN, 1 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS §§ 1:51, 3.1 (2d ed.) (noting that “[w]hile
most states prohibit nonprofit corporations from issuing shares of stock, some states do permit
nonprofit corporations to issue shares of stock,” and that Pennsylvania corporations can be “both
stock or nonstock corporations”). But see George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance without
Shareholders: A Cautionary Lesson From Non-Profit Organizations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 93, 97-98
(2014) (although most non-profit corporations have boards of directors, “[u]nlike business
corporation, however, the boards of [non-profit corporations] are not elected by shareholders
because [non-profit organizations] have no shareholders”).
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It is precisely for the important benefits that come from being an entity that such
corporations are formed. 216 In the leading incorporation state, Delaware, non-profit
corporations cannot have shareholders. 217 And in keeping with the distinction
between for-profit and non-profit organizations, the ABA endorses a Model
Business Corporation Act for business organizations and a separate Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act for non-profit organizations. Most states following the model acts,
therefore, have distinct statutes for business corporations and non-profits. 218 To this

216

E.g., PHELAN, 1 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 215, § 1:64 (“Most nonprofits are
incorporated. The corporate form provides limited liability, centralized management, and more
defined and flexible operational guidelines.”); id. § 1:2 (“Benefits provided nonprofit
organizations that are not available to profit organizations make operation as a nonprofit attractive.
Most, though not all, nonprofit organizations are exempt from federal income taxation. Securities
issued by some nonprofit organizations are not subject to the Securities Act of 1933. Nonprofit
organizations cannot be subjected to involuntary bankruptcy. In the absence of an intent or purpose
to affect the commercial aspects of a profession, the applicability of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
applicability to nonprofit organizations is limited. Nonprofit organizations having no shares of
stock and that do not carry on business for their own profit or that of their members (within the
meaning of the word profit as attributed to profit organizations), are not subject to regulation by
the Federal Trade Commission as to charges of unfair competition.”).
217
Id. § 1:20 (noting that Delaware law does not authorize non-profit corporations to issue stock).
Although the Revised Model Non-Profit Act does permit non-profits to issue shares, it is rather
uncommon for non-profits to do so. See generally ALI–ABA, Model Nonprofit Corporation Act
(2008); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 206 (1982)
(“Most states apparently permit nonprofit corporations to have “members’ similar to shareholders
in a business corporation, although state statutes generally do not seem to require this form of
organization; in many states the Board of Directors of a nonprofit corporation may be an
autonomous, self-perpetuating body.”) (citations omitted); Henry Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit
Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 575–78 (1981) (discussing the different states’
approaches to non-profit formation).
218
For example, California has a Corporations code with specific chapters for “General
Corporation Law” and “Nonprofit Corporation Law.” Compare Cal. Corp. Code Div. 1, with Cal.
Corp. Code Div. 2. Likewise, New York has a “Business Corporation Law” code and a “Not-forProfit Corporation Law” code. Compare N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 101 et seq. (McKinney), with
N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp. Law § 101 et seq. (McKinney).
96

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118

point, Citizens United, the litigant, was a non-stock, non-profit membership
corporation incorporated in Virginia with an expressive purpose. 219 Therefore, if
Citizens United the corporation was an “association of citizens,” 220 it was not one
involving an association of shareholders. But Citizens United, the judicial decision,
was not about just non-profit corporations. If Citizens United, as a case, had applied
only to non-profits, it would not have had much effect.
Now, we concede that as to non-profit corporations formed for a specific
charitable or other non-profit purpose, it is more logical to assume that the members
are united in their support of that purpose. The reason for that is obvious, which is
that the members cannot expect any economic return and therefore can be presumed
to have become a member solely because of their interest in advancing the entity’s
stated non-profit goals. 221 To that end, Professor Hansmann has observed that “the
corporate law that has been developed for business corporations, and particularly

219

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, Joint Appendix at 10A, 2009 WL 62995 (Jan. 8,
2009) (Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Dec. 21, 2007)).
Virginia has a separate code for “Stock” and “Nonstock” corporations. Compare Va. Code Ann.
§ 13.1-601 et seq., with Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-801 et seq. Virginia nonstock corporations, of
which Citizens Untied was, are not allowed to issue dividends to their members and are effectively
non-profit organizations. Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-814 (West) (“A corporation shall not issue shares
of stock. No dividend shall be paid and no part of the income of a corporation shall be distributed
to its members, directors or officers, except that a corporation may make distributions to another
nonprofit corporation that is a member of such corporation or has the power to appoint one or more
of its directors.”).
220
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349.
221
See generally PHELAN, 1 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 215, § 1:1 (“A nonprofit
organization, whether incorporated or operated as a trust or as an unincorporated association, is an
organization in which no part of the income is distributable to its members, directors, or officers.”).
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that which concerns the fiduciary obligations of corporate management, often
provides a poor model for nonprofit corporation law.” 222
Most essential to our argument in this article is the law’s treatment of forprofit corporations, which have as their goal the attainment of profits for the benefit
of their stockholders. In Citizens United, the Supreme Court accepted as to all
corporations, including those most relevant to society in terms of their effect on the
fairness of our polity’s electoral process, a view that it has refused to adhere to in
other contexts. As important, Citizens United failed to take into account basic
differences between business corporations and non-profit corporations: differences
that the Court has acknowledged and recognized in other cases.
For example, the Supreme Court has consistently denied for-profit
corporations standing to sue to vindicate the rights of their stockholders. 223 But in
the context of non-profit membership corporations, the Supreme Court has allowed
them standing to sue on behalf of their members because their members are deemed

222

Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L. J. 835, 845 (1980).
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977) (“In the
ordinary case, a party is denied standing to assert the rights of third persons.”) (citing Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379
(1982) (“In determining whether [a corporation] has standing . . . we conduct the same inquiry as
in the case of an individual.”); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (holding that to
establish concrete injury—standing analysis’s first prong—“a mere ‘interest in a problem’ no
matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating
the problem, is not sufficient by itself.”).
223
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to be united in their relevant values and to have joined the membership corporation
to advance those values. 224
As to the failure of Citizens United to hew to the same distinctions in
addressing McCain-Feingold, it also is important to recognize how membership
organizations typically fund their activities, including those involving speech. It is
not by using funds contributed by their members in their capacity as members.
Rather, these corporations raise money by voluntary, tax-subsidized
charitable contributions. 225 Members, typically involved as directors, are usually

224

Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342–45 (1977) (“Even in the
absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the representative of its
members.”) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)). The Supreme Court has held
that associational standing attaches to an organization “when: (a) its members would otherwise
have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Id. at 343. Admittedly, in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–69 (2014), the Supreme Court allowed the for-profit
Hobby Lobby corporation to sue to vindicate the religious beliefs of the family that controlled a
majority of the corporation’s equity. Like Citizens United, Hobby Lobby can be seen as a case
where, for similar ideological reasons, the majority took a view of corporations it fails to embrace
in other areas of law. The Court failed to address constitutional standing in Hobby Lobby, but
nonetheless held that a for-profit corporation is a “person” and entitled to statutory standing under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–69 (2014); see
also Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 141–
44 (2014) (highlighting that Hobby Lobby “addressed the separate claims brought by individual
owners themselves” and warning that “the notion that the owners could sue on behalf of legally
separate corporations would raise still more problematic issues of third-party standing”).
225
See generally PHELAN, 1 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 215, § 1:2 (“[N]onprofit
organizations have financing problems. Equity financing is not available, and debt financing can
be difficult to obtain. Reliance upon donations can be illusory. The founders, members, directors,
and officers of a nonprofit organization cannot share in any profits the organization may generate.
As noted above, there can be no distribution of profits of nonprofit organizations. Founders,
members, directors, and officers can only be paid a reasonable salary for services they perform for
the organizations.”).
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expected to donate heavily to the charity and, more important, to help raise funds.226
But, the key point is that these corporations do not in fact use corporate funds
donated by their equity investors to fund their speech activities. Rather, these
corporations must do exactly what was permitted by McCain-Feingold’s PAC
authorization: seek out voluntary donations based on donors’ support for the causes
and positions adhered to by the corporation.
Precisely because of these realities, non-profit corporations pose little danger
of compelled speech using funds freighted by a legal and equitable obligation toward
the corporations’ equity holders. That is because, as was required of unions under
Abood and its progeny, 227 and as was required by McCain-Feingold for both
corporations and unions,228 non-profit corporations must fund their speech by
specifically raising funds voluntarily for that purpose from donors. As we have
shown, no responsible commentator on American corporate law on the left or the

226

“68 percent of nonprofit organizations have a policy requiring board members to make a
personal contribution on an annual basis. Boards average 74 percent participation in giving.” THE
BRIDGESPAN GROUP, BOARD MEMBERS AND PERSONAL CONTRIBUTIONS (2010),
https://www.bridgespan.org/bridgespan/images/articles/board-members-and-personalcontributions/BoardMembersPersonalContributions.pdf?ext=.pdf; see also Hansmann, The Role
of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 222, at 877 (“Because nonprofits are unable to sell equity
shares, they must rely largely upon donations, retained earnings, and debt for capital financing.
The funds available from these sources may, however, be poorly matched to the capital needs of
the organization. Donations may reflect merely the whims of contributors.”). Although there are
some non-profits—termed “commercial nonprofits”—that “receive the bulk of their income from
prices charged for their services,” such as nursing homes and hospitals, the non-profits most likely
to be a collective of individuals advocating for a cause are “donative nonprofits,” “that receive
most or all of their income in the form of grants or donations.” Id. at 840–41.
227
See Abood, 431 U.S. at 233–36.
228
52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2).
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right believes that stockholders in American business corporations invest in their
stock because they desire to have those corporations engage in political speech on
their behalf. Any belief of that kind ignores all relevant empirical facts known about
corporations and their stockholders.
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Conclusion
In this Article we have championed three ideas. First and foremost we have
argued that the core assertion on which the Supreme Court’s opinion in Citizens
United is based, which is that a corporation is an “associations of shareholders” 229 is
wrong. The corporation is not an association of citizens or even shareholders, either
under law, or in a theoretical sense. The whole point of the corporate form is to create
a discrete legal entity separate and apart from its shareholders. Unless such a separate
entity is created when a corporation is formed then the basic objective of the
corporation, which is to create an economic framework for amassing capital to be
deployed in economic activity, cannot be reached.
In arguing that corporations are economic entities with rights and obligations
separate and apart from their shareholders we make two ancillary points. First, we
show that, as a matter of logic and theory, the corporation cannot be conceptualized
simultaneously as an entity and as an association of shareholders. These conceptions
of the corporation are logical alternatives: they are substitutes not complements. The
corporation is, from an analytical perspective, an alternative form of business
organization to the partnership form. The partnership is an association of the partners
who own the enterprise. The point of allowing the creation of corporations is to create

229

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349.
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a legal framework to permit the formation of business organizations that are entities
rather than associations of shareholders.
Finally, moving from logic to authority we observe that, to the extent that the
question of whether a business organization is an entity or an association of
shareholders can be viewed as a matter of fact determined by the state law that creates
the organization in addition to being viewed as an existential matter. Supreme Court
precedent clearly establishes that state law, rather than federal law, is the appropriate
source for determining whether a corporation is an entity or an association of
shareholders. And state law is clear that corporations are entities separate and apart
from their shareholders.
Thus, whatever one might say about Citizens United from a constitutional law
perspective, the case is bad corporate law. The majority opinion mischaracterizes the
corporation, describing it as an “association of shareholders” when it is, in reality, a
separate and distinct legal entity. The flaws in the opinion are severe and manifest in
light of the fact that the Court provides no basis for the assertion that the corporation
is an association of shareholders and fails to recognize that corporations are creatures
of state law, and therefore state law rules should guide our understanding about the
essential nature of these entities.
Perhaps worst of all, the Court’s decision struck down bipartisan legislation that
allowed business corporations broad license to engage in political speech, but only
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required that they do so using funds specifically raised from voluntary donation by
their constituents—including stockholders. By this means, Congress left business
corporations with substantial expressive rights, but through means that took into
account the actual facts about what business corporations are and what they are not.
In the name of vindicating the expressive rights of American investors, the Court
therefore compelled millions of ordinary Americans to endure the involuntary use of
their equity capital for a purpose that they did not authorize and that has no rational
connection to their decision to invest.
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